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ABSTRACT 
The Design and Evaluation of Three Competitive Bidding 
Models for Application in the Construction Industry 
Paul Kevin Sugrue, B.S. United States Naval Academy 
M.B.A., University of Rhode Island 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Dr. William B. Whiston 
This dissertation deals with modeling the recurring 
bidding decisions made by construction contractors. Con¬ 
struction firms specializing in roadwork construction obtain 
the majority of their work contracts through open competitive 
bidding. Since under competitive bidding contracts are 
awarded to the lowest bidder, participating construction 
firms must decide upon and submit their bids under the uncer¬ 
tainty of their competitors' similar actions. 
Several decision models have been developed which capture 
the probabilistic nature of the bidding process. The princi¬ 
pal approach has been to assign a specific probability dis¬ 
tribution to competitor bids and to use this probability dis¬ 
tribution in selecting the bid which maximizes the expected 
value of the contract. The effectiveness of such a probabil¬ 
istic model in a competitive bidding problem is dependent 
upon the decision maker's ability to choose the appropriate 
tractable probability distribution and to solve the necessary 
optimization problem within the limitations of his or her 
decision making resources. 
V 
The development of the models in this dissertation in¬ 
cludes the selection of an appropriate tractable probability 
distribution, the formulation of an expected value expres¬ 
sion, and the computation of an optimal bid, where an opti¬ 
mal bid is the one which maximizes the expected monetary 
value of the contract. The models discussed were developed 
under the consideration of the limitations of the decision 
maker in applying quantitative models. Typically these li¬ 
mitations include the lack of computer facilities and the 
limited analytical training of the decision maker. In con¬ 
sideration of these constraints, a numerical approximation 
technique is employed in each modeling approach in deter¬ 
mining the optimal bid and bid tables are designed to assist 
in the required computations. 
Three decision models designed for application in the 
construction industry are developed. For the first model 
a probabiity distribution of the ratio of the lowest competi¬ 
tor bid to the decision maker's cost estimate is used in 
computing the expected value of the profit to be received 
from the contract. Assuming a normal probability distribu¬ 
tion, the optimal bid is approximated using the Newton- 
Raphson approximation method. In the second model, a pro¬ 
bability distribution of the ratio of competitor bid to the 
decision maker's cost estimate is assumed to exist for each 
competitor. Assuming normal probability distributions and 
VI 
assuming independence among these competitor distributions, 
an expected value expression is derived. The Newton-Raphson 
approximation method is employed in approximating the bid 
which maximizes the expected value expression. The bid to 
decision maker's cost estimate ratio for each compeitor is 
assumed to be generated by a normal regression process in 
the third model. The output of each regression model is used 
to construct a joint probability distribution which is ap¬ 
plied in approximating the optimal bid as in the second 
model. Tables are constructed for terms contained in the 
analytical optimization expressions of the three models. 
The validity of the assumptions under which the models 
are developed are tested with empirical bidding data. Tests 
for goodness of fit and for independence are conducted. Ac¬ 
tual bidding results, in terms of contracts won and resulting 
profits, are compared to the results which would have been 
obtained by applying the bidding models. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PREVIOUS WORK IN COMPETITIVE BIDDING MODELS 
This dissertation deals with modeling the recurring 
bidding decisions made by construction contractors. Con¬ 
struction firms specializing in roadwork construction 
obtain the majority of their work contracts through open 
competitive bidding. Since under competitive bidding 
contracts are awarded to the lowest bidder, participating 
construction firms must decide upon and submit their bids 
under the uncertainty of their competitors' similar actions. 
« 
Several decision models have been developed which 
capture the probabilistic nature of the bidding process. 
The principal approach has been to assign a specific proba¬ 
bility distribution to competitor bids and to use this 
probability distribution in selecting the bid which maxi¬ 
mizes the expected value of the contract. The effectiveness 
of such a probabilistic model in a competitive bidding 
problem is dependent upon the decision maker's ability to 
choose the appropriate tractable probability distribution 
and to solve the necessary optimization problem within the 
limits of his resources. 
The development of the models in this dissertation 
includes the selection of an appropriate tractable probabil¬ 
ity distribution, the formula of an expected value expression, 
and the computation of an optimal bid, where an optimal is 
the one which maximizes the expected monetary value of the 
2 
contract. The models to be discussed were developed under 
the consideration of the limitations of the decision maker 
in applying quantitative models. Typically these limitations 
include the lack of computer facilities and the limited 
analytical training of the decision maker. In consideration 
of these constraints, a numerical approximation technique is 
employed in each modeling approach in determining the optimal 
bid and bid tables are designed to' assist in the required 
computations. 
A summary of a sample of the research work which has 
been published in the area of competitive bidding models is 
presented in Chapter 2. The work discussed covers a broad 
spectrum of competitive bidding decisions in business, 
including: corporate securities, oil leases, timber pur¬ 
chases and construction work. 
Three decision models designed for application in the 
construction industry are developed in Chapter 3. For the 
first model a probability distribution of the ratio of the 
lowest competitor bid to the decision maker's cost estimate 
is used in computing the expected value of the profit to be 
received from the contract. Assuming a normal probability 
distribution, the optimal bid is approximated, for a given 
cost estimate, using the Newton-Raphson approximation method. 
In the second model, a probability distribution of the ratio 
of competitor bid to the decision maker's cost estimte is 
assumed to exist for each competitor. Assuming a normal 
probability distribution for each competitor and assuming 
3 
independence among these competitor distributions, an ex¬ 
pected value expression is derived. The Newton-Raphson 
approximation method is employed in approximating the bid 
which maximizes the expected value expression. The bid to 
decision maker's cost estimate ratio for each competitor is 
assumed to be generated by a normal regression process in 
the third model. The output of each regression model is 
used to construct a joint probability distribution which is 
applied in approximating the optimal bid as in model two. 
In Chapter 4 tables are constructed for terms contained 
in the analytical optimization expressions of the three 
models developed in Chapter 3. These tables permit the 
decision maker to compute an approximation of the optimal 
bid with the parameters of the respective distributions and 
a cost estimate, with a few simple hand calculations. 
Examples of the application of the tables and the approxima¬ 
tion technique are presented. The precision of the approxi¬ 
mation method is demonstrated by comparing the results of 
the second modeling approach to the optimal bids obtained by 
computer simulation. 
The validity of the assumptions under which the models 
are developed are tested with empirical data in Chapter 5. 
Data from sixty-eight sample contracts are used to test the 
hypothesis of the normality of the distribution of the 
lowest competitor bid to cost ratios. From the same sample 
data, sample bid to cost ratios are extracted for eleven 
4 
individual contractors in order to test the hypotheses of 
the normality of each individual distribution. Regression 
models are derived from this same data for the eleven compe¬ 
titors using four independent variables. The significance 
of the regression coefficients for the four independent 
variables are tested for each of the eleven models. The 
independence among the distributions is tested by extracting 
paired observations for six pairs of competitors and using 
the computed correlation coefficients to test the hypotheses 
that the coefficients equal zero. The actual bidding re¬ 
sults, in terms of contracts won and resulting profits, for 
the sixty-eight sample bids are compared to the results 
which would have been obtained by applying models one and 
two to the same sixty-eight bids. 
CHAPTER 2 
PREVIOUS WORK IN COMPETITIVE BIDDING MODELS 
Competitive bidding under conditions of uncertainty has 
been discussed in quantitative methods literature as it is 
applied to several business environments, ranging from 
bidding on construction contracts to corporate bond issues. 
The approaches can be classified into two general areas; 
decision and game theoretic. The application of game 
theory to most bidding decisions encountered in business is 
limited by the number of participants, which generally 
exceeds two. The two person game in competitive bidding 
provides an interesting framework for a theoretic solution, 
but the situation is rarely encountered in many business, 
applications where competitive bidding is encountered,. The 
decision theoretic approaches vary in degrees of complexity 
and applicability to actual bidding problems. A review of 
the work done in developing quantitative models designed to 
be applied to bidding problems will provide a background and 
framework for the models to be developed in this research. 
The first appearance in the literature of the applica¬ 
tion of operations research models to the competitive bidding 
decision was in 1955 in an article by Lawrence Friedman.^ 
Much of the subsequent work in the area has been built upon 
^Lawrence Friedman, "A Competitive Bidding Strategy, 
Operations Research, 4 (1956), 104-112. 
II 
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his initial ideas. While mentioning several objectives 
which the bidder may have in bidding, the model presented 
is based upon the objective of maximization of the expected 
profit resulting from the bid on each individual contract. 
The general expression for this expected profit for a bid 
of x is: 
E(x)=p(x)(x-c') 
where c’ is the estimated cost of completing the contract, 
x is the bidder's bid and p(x) is the probability of winning 
with a bid of x. Recognizing the uncertainty of the true 
cost, a probability distribution, f(s), of the ratio of true 
cost to estimated cost, s, is used to compute the expected 
value of the estimated cost, where: 
c,=c7sf(s)ds 
0 
This expected value expression is independent of the bid. 
The bidder's objective is then to select the bid which 
maximizes the expected value, E(x), given an expected cost 
ofg'. If the bidder is bidding against n competitors, the 
probability of winning is the product of the marginal proba¬ 
bilities of winning against each competitor. Friedman ex¬ 
tends his model to the case where the bidder is bidding 
against an unknown number of bidders. In this case a density 
function, f(r), for an average bidder's bid to cost ratio is 
used. This bid to cost ratio is the ratio of the competi¬ 
tor's actual bid to the decision maker's estimated cost. The 
7 
probability of winning when bidding against one average 
bidder is therefore: 
oo 
p(x)= / f(r)dr, 
x/c' 
which is the probability that the ratio of the average 
bidder's bid to the decision maker's cost is greater than 
the ratio of the decision maker's bid to his cost. The 
probability of winning against k independent average bidders 
is then: 
.00 
p(x) = ( / f(r)dr)k. 
x/c' 
When the number of bidders, k, is unknown, it is assumed 
that a probability density function, g(k), can be deter¬ 
mined. The probability of winning when bidding against 'an 
unknown number of average bidders can then be expressed as: 
CO 00 
p(x)= I g(k)( / f(r)dr)k. 
k=0 x/c' 
Friedman suggested that f(r) could be approximated with a 
gamma distribution and g(k) with a poisson distribution. 
Substituting these probability functions, the expected value 
expression becomes: 
b . . 
E(x)=(x-c')exp(-A(1- I (1/1I)(ax/c)1e“ax/C)), 
i=l 
where: f(r)=(a^+^/b!)r^e a“ 
and: g(k)=Ake */k!. 
Friedman suggests obtaining the optimal bid graphically and 
notes that a solution for the optimal bid is not available 
in closed form. 
Edelman discusses the value of a quantitative approach 
2 
to competitive bidding in a non-mathematical presentation. 
The model described was incorporated and tested at the Radio 
Corporation of America. Using a case study as a vehicle, 
Edelman analyzes the trade-off between the marginal profit if 
the contract is won and the marginal loss if the contract is 
lost. Probabilities for winning at various price levels are 
determined subjectively from management judgment and an op¬ 
timal trade-off price is selected as the one which maximizes 
the expected marginal profit contribution. 
It is assumed that the contract is not necessarily won 
by the lowest bidder. Edelman graphs the probability of win¬ 
ning a bid against the percent that protagonist's bid is above 
or below his competitor's bid. These probabilities are sub¬ 
jectively assigned. The decision maker assigns a likelihood 
to each of a series of competitor bids, over a particular re¬ 
levant range. A range of possible protagonist and competitor 
bids are used to construct a matrix of award probabilities. 
An example of this matrix is shown in figure 1. The A^ 
entries in the matrix are obtained from a subjective pro¬ 
bability graph as described above. Each pair of competitor 
Franz Edelman, "Art and Science of Competitive Bidding, 
Harvard Business Review, 43 (August, 1965), 53-66. 
II 
FIGURE 1 
Computation of winning probabilities for a competitive 
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will win with bid B^ 
10 
and protagonist bids yields a ratio with which a probability 
of winning can be determined from the graph. Each column 
entry in the matrix is discounted by the likelihood of the 
bid associated with the respective column and the resulting 
discounted probabilities are summed across the rows, yield¬ 
ing the expected probability of winning, , given a bid of 
B^. These probabilities are then used to compute the expected 
marginal profit contribution for each possible bid in order to 
determine the bid which maximizes this expected value. 
A decision model for the competitive bidding situation 
3 
as encountered in timber purchasing was presented by Taylor. 
In bidding on timber in government sponsored sealed auctions, 
each competitor must submit a bid in excess of the United 
States Forest Service's appraised value for the timber (stump- 
age) . This appraised value is published by the Forest Service 
prior to the invitation for bids. The firm submitting the 
highest bid wins the purchase rights to the timber on a spe¬ 
cified government owned parcel of land, at the bid price. 
The profit to the winning firm, P, is: 
P=R-V-S 
where R is the market value of the processed timber, V is 
the cost of processing the timber and S is the bid price. 
3 
Norman Taylor, "A Bidding Model for Timber Purchasing, 
Research Program in Marketing, Graduate School of Business 
Administration, University of California at Berkley, special 
publication of the Institute of Business and Economic Re¬ 
search (1963), 28-44. 
11 
For each competitor, Taylor suggests deriving from past bid¬ 
ding behavior a cumulative probability function for the ratio 
of the bid price to the appraised value. From the respective 
cumulative probability distribution, the bidder can assess 
the probability of winning against each competitor. Assuming 
independence among competitor bids, the probability of win¬ 
ning a contract is equal to the product of the probabilities 
of winning against each individual competitor. With these 
probability assessments, expected profit values are enumerated 
for a range of possible bids and the bid which results in the 
highest expected profit is chosen. In cases where the bidder 
is not aware of the identity of his competitors prior to sub¬ 
mission of a bid, Taylor suggests using a cumulative probabil¬ 
ity function for the average bidder. 
A Bayesian decision theoretic modeling approach to the 
4 
modeling decision was presented by Christenson. The appli¬ 
cation of his work was in the investment banking field, where 
competitive bidding is encountred in the pricing of corporate 
securities. The basic structure of the approach was based 
upon the initial work by Friedman. The value to the bidder 
of winning a bid, net of all costs except the bid, is normal¬ 
ized to a value of one. The return to the bidder if the bid 
is won is therefore, (l-bQ), where bQ is the normalized 
4 
Charles Christenson, Strategic Aspects of Competitive 
Bidding for Corporate Securities (Boston: Division of Research, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 
1965), 72-89. 
12 
value of the bid. Defining Q(bQ) as the probability that 
each competitor bid is less than bQ, the expected monetary 
value resulting from a bid of bQ is expressed as: 
M(b )=(1-b )Q(b ). 
o o o 
The first order condition for a maximum is obtained by dif¬ 
ferentiating the above expression with respect to b , which 
yields: 
M' (bo) = (l-bo)q(bo)-Q(bo)=0 
l/(l-bo)=q(bo)/Q(bo). 
Noting the difficulty in assessing the joint probability dis¬ 
tribution, Q(bQ), for each possible subset of competitors and 
the large number of these potential subsets (2n for n compe¬ 
titors) , Christenson suggests deriving a conditional marginal 
probability distribution for each competitor, which can be 
assumed to be independent. Defining a vector of character¬ 
istics for issued to be bid on, a marginal distribution func¬ 
tion for each competitor can be assessed, conditional on this 
vector of characteristics. It is reasoned that any depen¬ 
dence among the competitor bids is a consequence of their 
common dependence upon the characteristics of the issue be¬ 
ing bid on. Under the assumption of independence, based 
upon this reasoning, the probability that an issue will be 
won with a bid of b is expressed as: 
o 




where x^ represents the characteristics vector of the i 
issue and Fj(bQ|x^) represents the j*"*1 competitor's condi- 
th 
tional probability distribution for the 1 issue. 
Christenson develops a procedure for assessing these 
conditional distributions for each competitor based upon a 
normal regression process. The theory upon which this ap- 
5 
proach was based was developed by Raiffa and Schlaifer. 
Lavalle also viewed the bidding decision from a Bayesian 
decision theoretic viewpoint.^ It is assumed in his work that 
there are two bidders and that the protagonist is uncertain 
of both value value of the object being bid on, W, and his 
opponent's bid, M. The value of the bid to the protagonist, 
v, is expressed as: 
v (a ,M) = 
W-a if a>M 
if a<M 
where a is the value of the protagonist's bid. The expected 
gain to the bidder for a bid of a is: 
V(a)=E[v(a,M)]=EwEmjwv(a,M)=EW(W-a)FM;w(a). 
Lavalle suggested that an optimal bid a* can be derived 
from the above expression by a search procedure. If M and 
5 
Howard Raiffa and Robert Schlaifer, Applied Statis¬ 
tical Decision Theory (Boston, 1961), 290-309. 
^Irving H. Lavalle, "A Bayesian Approach to an Individual 
Player's Choice of Bid in Competitive Sealed Auctions," Manage- 
ment Science, 13 (March, 1967), 584-597. 
14 
W are assumed to be independent, the above expression be¬ 
comes : 
V(a)=(EwW-a)FM(a), 
where E_^W is a certainty equivalent. Setting the first deri¬ 
vative o f the expected value expression, V(a), equal to zero 
to satisfy the first order condition for the root a*: 
V(a*)=-FM(a*)+EwW-a*)fM(a*) 
FM(a*,/fM(a*,=EWW"a*- 
With this result, Lavalle discusses the effects of acquired 
perfect information on M and W by the protagonist. 
Capen, Clapp and Campbell discuss a bidding model which 
they developed and implemented at the Atlantic Richfield 
7 
Corporation. Development of the model, which applies to 
bidding on oil leases, resulted from investigations of the 
bidding process by Atlantic Richfield's own team of analysts. 
The paper represents one of the few public discussions of a 
working bidding model by a source within industry. As Fried¬ 
man noted in his work, details of successful applications of 
operations research to the development of bidding strategies 
ate not ordinarily made public for reasons of industrial se- 
curity. This inside view of the work being done within in¬ 
dustry provides a motivation for external efforts. 
7 
E. C. Capen, R. V. Clapp, and W. M. Campbell, "Compe¬ 
titive Bidding in High Risk Situations," Journal of Petro¬ 
leum Technology, (June, 1971), 641-653. 
8 
Lawrence Friedman, op. cit., p. 106. 
15 
As a motivation for their work, the authors cite com¬ 
piled data from the results of the 1969 Alaska North Slope 
sale, in which the major oil companies engated in competitive 
bidding for oil leases. The sum of the winning bids from the 
sale was $900 million, while the sum of the second highest 
bids was $370 million, in other words on average the second 
highest bidder was willing to bid only 41 percent as much 
as the winner. In addition, in 26 percent of the instances 
if the second highest bidders had increased their bids by 
400 percent, they still would have lost. 
The model developed by Capen et al. utilizes maximiza¬ 
tion of the expected monetary value of the bid as the cri¬ 
terion for bid selection. The value of the bid is the present 
value of.the tract being bid on, discounted at the firm's in¬ 
ternal rate of return, net of the amount of the bid. A bid 
on an oil lease is ordinarily a fraction of the estimated 
value of the oil reserves recoverable from the tract. This 
estimated tract value is regarded as a random variable for 
both the bidder and his competitors. Various values of the 
bid level, the fraction of the estimated value which is bid, 
are assumed for the bidder and his competitors in simulating 
the model. Defining f^(*) as the probability density func- 
4- Vi 
tion of the i competitor's bid, and g(*) as the probability 
density function of the bidder's bid, the probability density 
function of the bidder's winning bid, x, becomes: 
16 
n 
h(x)=k ( n F.(x))g(x) 
XI • ^ X * 
i=l 
where is a constrant which makes the integral of h(x) over 
all possible values of x equal to one, and (x) is the prob- 
th 
ability that the i competitor bids less than x. The ex- 
pected value of the winning bid, x , is expressed as: 
oo n 
E(x )= fx k ( n F . (x) ) g (x) dx . 
w' -oo n . , l ^ 
i=l 
The objective is then to select the value of x which maxi- 
J w 
% 
mizes this expected value. It is suggested that the proba¬ 
bility distributions for the value estimates of the bidder 
and the competitors can be approximated with a log-normal 
probability distribution, although no empirical evidence was 
presented to justify the selection of this distribution. 
The optimum bids were selected by computer simulation of the 
model. 
Dougherty and Nozaki also discuss a modeling approach 
9 
to a competitive bidding situation in the oil industry. As 
in the work of Capen et al. the values of the tract are esti¬ 
mated by the bidder and his competitors are treated as ran¬ 
dom variables.^ The modeling approach assumes that the 
9 
E. L. Dougherty and M. Nozaki, "Determining Optimum 
Bid Fraction," Journal of Petroleum Technology, (March, 
1975), 349-356. 
l^Capen, Clapp, and Campbell, op. cit., p. 646. 
17 
the bidder's objective is to select the bid which maximizes 
the expected value of the gain from the bid. The expected 
value of the bidder's gain from a tract is given by: 
v_ .true value of. ,Prob. bidder. .Prob. Competitors, 
the tract-bid bids x bid less than x 
The bidder's bid x is the product of the bidder's estimate of 
the value of the tract, v , and the bidder's bid fraction, 
cq. The objective of the model is to select the optimum bid 
fraction, the value of cq corresponding to the maximum value 
of EV. Assuming that the value estimats of the bidder, v , 
th 
and v^ for the 1 competitor are gamma distributed with para 
meters (A ,rQ) and ^*i'ri^' resPect^u^Y' the probability 
that the bidder's bid will be between x and x+dx is given by: 
T ”1 -T x/c 
gp (x)dx=(r /cq(rQx/cq) ° e ° 0)/(rQ-l)!dx 
o 
In this experssion, it is assumed that the mean of the stan¬ 
dardized value estimate is one, from which follows: 
y=r/A=l therefore A=r 
The variance of the distribution is therefoer: 
°r,x2=r/x2=1/r 
The probability that competitor i will bid less than x is 
given by: 
x x — r.x/c 
F.(x)=/f (x)dx=/(r./cH (r.X/c.)e 1 1)/(r.-l):dx 
1 0 1 i 0 
18 
The expected value of the bid resulting from a bid of x can 
be expressed as: 
00 r -1 - r x/c 
ev=/(i-x)((ro/co<rox/co) e ° °)/(rQ-i:). 
0 x -r./c. 
(/(r./c. (r.x/c.)e 1 1)/(r.-i) :dx)ndx 
o 1 
where n represents the number of competitors. Assuming that 








For assumed values of r , T^, c^, and n, a Fibonacci search 
procedure is used to locate the value of cq for which the 
expected value is greatest. Various relationships between 
the number of competitors and the optimum bid fraction can 
be examined graphically after simulating the above expression 
for the expected value. 
The case of bidding on a series of contracts when the 
bid total for the contracts is limited is discussed by 
Stark and Mayer. Expressing the expected value of contract 
l as: 
(b. -c .) P (b. , k. ) , 
l i l' l 
^Robert Stark and Robert H. Mayer, "Some Multi-Contract 
Decision Teeoretic Competitive Bidding Models," Operations 
Research, 19 (March-April, 1971), 469-483. 
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where b represents the amount of the bid, c the associated 
cost of performing the contract, and P(b^,k^) the probability 
of winning the contract with a bid of b^ and a contract size 
k^, the expected value of a series of n contracts can be ex¬ 
pressed as: 
■n 
E= E (b.-c.)P.(b.,k.) 
. , 1 1 1 1 1 • 
i=l 
If the total amount to be bid is constrained by the bid total 
B, that is b^+b2+ * * * +b <B, the optimal bid mix, in the 
case where the unconstrained bid total exceeds B, can be de¬ 
termined by the method of LaGrangian multiplier. The La- 
Grangian formulation is: 
n n 
L= E (b.-c.)P,(b.,k.)+X( E b.-B). 
i=l i l 1 l 1 i=i 1 
i 
The constrained optimum bid mix can be determined by solving 
the simultaneous equations; 6L/6b. "fiL/ab^ • • • «<5L/<$ A = 0. 
This approach is limited in that it is necessary to assume 
that bids must bo submitted on all n contracts. 
Another approach, which was discussed, was to use dyna¬ 
mic programming and consider each bid selection an a stage 
in the program formulation. Lotting ll^(b.,n) represent the 
expected profit resulting from an allocation of dollars among 
| j. 
the last i contracts, th# optimal bid selection for the i 
contract would be: 
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bi*(s)=Max0lbils(n.(b.,s)) 
=Max0<b. <s ( (bi"ci)pi d"5 (bi) )+ni_i* (s-bi) ) , 
— l— 
where 5(u) is the Kronecker Delta, that is 6(u)=l when u=0 
and-zero otherwise. 
A third approach, discussed in the work, is to formulate 
the problem as a zero-one integer programming problem. The 
% 
range of feasible bids on each contract is divided into a 
number of intervals, s. The problem of selecting the bid 
which maximizes the expected value for an individual contract 
is equivalent to selecting the appropriate interval. The prob¬ 
lem would be formulated as: 
s 
Maximize z= E x . (b.-c)P(b.,k) 
j=0 3 3 3 
Subject s 
to E x . <1 and x.=0 or 1, 
j=0 3 3 
where b^ represents the bid level at the upper extreme of the 
interval. For a series of n contracts, the problem for¬ 





z= E Ex., (b. .-c.)P• (b. .,k.) 
i=l j=o 1D J 
E (x. .)<1 for i=l to n 
j=0 13 - 
n s 
E E b. .z. . <B 
i=l j-0 13 1]- 
x. .=0 or 1, 
1D 
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where B is the total amount to be bid on the n contracts. 
Bidding models ordinarily view the selection of an opti¬ 
mal bid from the perspective of one of the n bidders. This 
approach does not consider the implications of the adoption 
of similar optimization models by other competitors. In 
other words, what if each bidder were to bid to maximize his 
expected value? Rothkopf explores this issue and proves the 
12 
existence of an equilibrium set of strategies for n bidders. 
Rothkopf assumes that each bidder is unaware of the true cost 
of performing the contract, c, and selects a bid based upon a 
cost estimate, c'. It is further assumed that the ratios of 
the cost estimates to the actual cost, for all competitors, 
are independent with known probability distributions. The 
bidding strategy of competitor i is a function of his cost 
th 
estimate c^'. Assuming a multiplicative strategy for the i 
competitor, the bid can be expressed as: 
x.=h(c.')=P•c.' 
l i l 
where p^ is the markup multiplier of the i^ competitor and 
x^ is the bid of competitor i. The cumulative probability 
distribution of the l competitor's bid, x^, is given by 
F^(x^) and the density of x^ by f^(x^). Rothkopf assumes a 
two parameter Weibull distribution for these functions. The 
12Michael H. Rothkopf, "A Model of Rational Competitive 
Bidding," Management Science, 15 (March, 1969), 362-373. 
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expected profit of the i competitor can be expressed as: 
E•=?(x.-c.)f. (x.) n (l-F . (x,))dx. 
0 1 1 1 1 j*l 31 1 
Rothkopf describes a rational bidder as one who will bid to 
maximize the expected profit of the bid, in other words a 
rational bidder will select the markup multiplier, p, which 
maximizes the expected value expression. This maximization 
can be achieved by setting the partial derivative of the ex¬ 
pected value expression, with respect to p, equal £o zero. 
In order to insure a maximum expected value, the second par¬ 
tial derivative of the expected value, with respect to p, 
must be less than zero. The conditions for an optimal stra¬ 
tegy for competitor i are: 
6E./<5p.=0 and 52E./6p.2<0. 
XX XI 
An equilibrium set of strategies for n competitors, 
(p.*,p * • • • p *) exists if the above conditions hold for 
all n competitors. Under the assumptionof the appropriate¬ 
ness of a two parameter Weibull distribution, Rothkopf solves 
for the equilibrium set of strategies analytically in the 
cases where there are n bidders with equal costs and two 
bidders with unequal costs. No analytical solution was of¬ 
fered for the case of more than two bidders with unequal costs. 
A table of numerically obtained strategies was presented for 
three and five bidders. This approach provides a means of 
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selecting an equilibrium point strategy, but under the limi¬ 
tation of the assumption that each competitor behaves in the 
same rational manner. A single spiteful or ignorant compe¬ 
titor can make this modeling approach useless. 
The independence among competitor bids is assumed in 
most quantitative modeling approaches to the competitive 
bidding problem. The assumption of independence allows one 
to express the probability of winning against n competitors 
as the product of the probabilities of winning agsint each 
individual competitor. This assumption of independence was 
questioned, in the case of bidding in the construction in- 
13 
dustry, by Gates. The alternative proposed by Gates was 
to determine the probability of winning against n competi¬ 
tors from the equation: 
P=l/((l-p(A))/p(A)+(l-p(B))/p(B)+ • • • +(l-p(N))/p(N)+l) 
where p(A) represents the probability of winning against com¬ 
petitor A. This representation was not derived or defended 
in the article. In response to Gates' article, Stark, while 
concurring in the general notion that bids may in fact be 




Martin Gates, "Bidding Strategies and Probabilities," 
Journal of the Construction Division: Proceedings of the 
American~SocTety of Civil Engineers, (March, 1967), 75-107. 
14Robert Stark, "Bidding Strategies and Probabilities, 
Discussion," Journal of the Construction Division: Proceed¬ 
ings of the American Society of Civil Engineers, (January, 
1968) “lO^lIT: 
24 
Gates, Baumgarten, and Benjamin present a derivation 
15 
of the equation in a later work. It is reasoned that if 
a bidder were bidding against two competitors, A and B, the 
probability of winning over both competitors would be: 
P(AaB) _ P (A) P (B) 
P(AOB) P (A)+P (B)-P (A) P (B) 
P(A)P(B)_ 




l-P(A) , l-P(B) ,, 
P (A) P (B) 1 
4 
which is the two competitor case of the previously stated 
general equation. This expression is not the joint probability 
of winning against both competitors, but rather the conditional 
probability of winning against both competitors given the bid¬ 
der wins against at least one of them: 
P( (AnB) | (AOB) ) = 




It is also interesting to note that in the derivation of an 
expression designed to present an alternative to the assump¬ 
tion of independence, the relation P (AAB)=P(A)P(B) is used 
repeatedly. This relationship is true only if the events 
A and B are in fact independent. 
5Ralph Baumgarten, Neal Benjamin, and Marvin Gates, 
"OPBID: Competitive Bidding Strategy Model," Journal of the 
Construction Division: Proceedings of the American Society 
of Civil Engineers, (June, 1970), 88-91. 
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In the absence of a valid alternative, it would appear 
reasonable to assume independence when the events can be 
reasoned to be independent. Given the quantity of infor¬ 
mation which is shared by competitors in bidding, it is reason¬ 
able to assume that conditional on this common information the 
distribution of their bids would be independent. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE DESIGN OF THREE COMPETITIVE BIDDING MODELS 
Prior to submitting a bid on a contract, a bidder is 
typically unaware of the bids to be submited by his competi¬ 
tors. It will be assumed in this analysis that the bidder 
possesses only publicly available information on past compe¬ 
titor bidding behavior and characteristics of the contract 
being bid on. This assumption is necessary in order to ex¬ 
clude the possibility of collusion and other unfair bidding 
practices. With this available information on past bidding 
behavior and contract characteristics, the bidder must se¬ 
lect a bid. This bid can be expressed in relation to the 
bidder's estimated cost of completing the contract, as a. ratio 
of the bid to the cost estimate. A bid to cost ratio of one 
would mean that the bidder selects a bid equal to his esti¬ 
mated cost. For purposes of clarification in this analysis, 
the bidding decision will be viewed from the perspective of 
one bidder, who will be referred to as 'the bidder.' In 
this analysis, all bids will be expressed in terms of a bid 
to cost ratio and in all cases the cost used in computing 
this ratio, will be the estimated cost of the bidder. 
The bidder can utilize various criteria in selecting 
his bid to cost ratio, however the decisior is typically 
based upon intuitive judgment. The criterion upon which 
this analysis will be based, is the maximization of the 
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expected monetary value of each individual contract. 
The probability that a contract is won with a particular 
bid to cost ratio, is equal to the probability that the bid¬ 
der's bid to cost ratio is lower than all competitor bid to 
cost ratios, where each competitor bid to cost ratio is 
based upon the bidder's estimated cost. Two approaches will 
be employed in assessing this probability. 
In the first approach, it will be assumed that the lowest 
competitor bid to cost ratio behaves as a random variable. 
The parameters of the assumed probability distribution can 
be estimated from past competitor bidding behavior. The pro¬ 
bability that the bidder wins a contract with a particular . 
bid ratio can be computed from the estimated distribution by 
computing the area to the right of the bidder's bid ratio, 
which is equal to the probability that the lowest competitor 
bid ratio is greater than the bidder's. 
The second approach to estimating the probability of 
winning with a particular bid ratio, is to view each indivi¬ 
dual competitor bid to cost ratio as a random variable pos¬ 
sessing its own probability distribution. The parameters of 
each of these assumed distributions can be estimated from 
historical bidding behavior. The probability that the bidder 
wins a contract is therefore equal to the probability that 
each individual competitor bid to cost ratio exceeds the 
bidder's bid to cost ratio. Assuming independence among 
the competitor bid to cost ratios, a joint probability 
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distribution can be derived as the product of the marginal 
distributions of each participating competitor. 
Three models, which are designed to approximate the op¬ 
timal bid under the decision criterion of the maximization of 
the.expected monetary value of each contract, will be pre¬ 
sented. The Newton-Raphson technique of approximating the 
root of an equation will be employed in each of the models 
to approximate this optimal bid. In the first model it will 
be assumed that the probability distribution of the lowest 
competitor bid to -cost ratio is a normal distribution whose 
parameters can be estimated from historical bidding data. 
In the second model it will be assumed that the distribution 
of individual competitor bid to cost ratios for each competi¬ 
tor is normal. In the third model it will be assumed that 
each competitor bid to cost ratio is generated by a normal 
regression process. 
Model I 
The difference between the bid to be submitted and the 
estimated cost of the contract, provides an estimate of the 
profit to be received from each contract. Let this profit 
be designated P. Letting the bidder's cost estimate b C 
and the bidder's bid be B , the estimated profit from the 
contract would be; P=(B -C). The expected value of this 
profit for a bid of Bq, would be estimated profit, if the 
contract is won, times the probability of winning the bid 
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with a bid of Bq, plus the probability of losing the contract 
with a bid of Bq times the profit if the contract is lost, 
which is zero. 
The probability distribution of the lowest competitor 
bid to cost ratio can be estimated, in terms of its parameters, 
from historical bidding data. Assuming that this distribution 
is approximately normal, the mean and standard deviation of 
the past lowest competitor bid ratios will provide unbiased 
estimates of the required parameters. Let M and S be the 
estimates of the mean and standard deviation of this distri¬ 
bution of B/C, where B is the lowest competitor bid and C is 
the bidder's cost estimate, as previously defined. The pro¬ 
bability of winning a contract with a bid of Bq is therefore 
equal to the area under this probability distribution to the 
right of the bidder's bid ratio of Bq/C. Define: 
G (B/C) = 7 (2I1S2) _!5exp-*5 ( ( (B/C) -M) /S) 2d (B/C) 
vc 
This right tail integral represents the probability that the 
lowest competitor bid ratio will be greater than the bidder's 
bid ratio of Bq/C, which is therefore the probability that 
the bidder wins the contract with a bid of Bq. 
The profit from a contract, resulting from a bid of B , 
can be expressed as: 
(B -C) if B /C is less than B/C 
_ o o 
0 otherwise 
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The expected monetary value of the profit from a contract 
for a bid of Bq can be expressed as: 
E(P)=(Bo-C)G(Bq/C)+(0)(l-G(Bo/C)) 
E(P)=(Bo-C)G(Bo/C). (1) 
Under the criterion of maximization of the expected monetary 
value, the bidder would desire to select the bid, B *, which 
o 
maximizes this expected value. This value of Bq which maxi¬ 
mizes the expected value will be considered to be the optimal 
bid and can be computed by setting the first derivative of 
the expected value (equation 1), with respect to B , equal 
to zero and solving for a root, Bq*. If the second deriva¬ 
tive of this expected value equation is negative, this root 
would yield a maximum value of the expected monetary value 
and would therefore be the optimal bid. The first derivative 
of the expected value expression would be: 
=(B -C)G' (B /C)+G(B /C) , 




G' (B /C)=dG(B /C)/dBo=-l/C (2nS2)_!sexp-M ( (BQ/C) -M)/S) 2 
G,(B0/C)=-i-(B/c). 
C^ 
Setting equation (2) equal to zero: 
E'(P)=G(Bq*/C)-((Bo*/C)-l)g(Bo*/C)=0 (3) 
The root which satisfies equation (3), Bq*, is the value of 
B which results in an extreme value of equation (1). 
o 
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Equation (3) can be expressed in terms of the normal density 
function as follows: 
E'(P)= 7 (2nS2)~i'2exp-h( ( (B/C)-M)/S) 2d (B/C) (4) 
• B°VC , . 
-( (Bo*/C)-l) (2tiS2) 2exp-*s( ( (B0*/C)-M)/S) 2 
Let z=((B/C)-M)/S and q=((Bq*/C)-M)/S in equation (4). Sub¬ 
stituting z and q into equation 4: 
E' (q) /( 2tt) ^exp-^z2dz-( (qS+M-1)/S) (2tt) “^exp-^q2 (5) 
q 
Equation (5) can be rewritten in the following form: 
E'(q) = (l-$(q))-((qS+M-1)/S)*(q) (6) 
where: 
(q)=/ (2tt) ^exp(-^z2) 
q 
<P (q) = (2TT) ~^exp (-hq2 ) 
Equation (6) can therefore be re-expressed as a function of 
the variable q: 
f(q)=(l-*(q))/ (q)-(qS+M-1)/S=0 (7) 
The Newton-Raphson method of approximating a root of an 
equation can be used to approximate a value of q which satis¬ 
fies equation (7). Since q is the number of standard devia¬ 
tions which the bidder's bid to cost ratio deviates from the 
mean of the lowest competitor bid to cost ratios, the value 
of q which satisfies equation (7) yields a value of 3 which 
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satisfies equation (3), since M and S are constants for any 
contract. In order to employ the Newton-Raphson technique, 
an initial approximation of the root of the equation must 
be chosen in order to perform an iteration which will yield 
a closer approximation. Given the magnitude and the range 
of the variable q, an initial selection of a value of one 
for q would always be a reasonably close initial approximation. 
Each subsequent iteration will yield a closer approximation. 
The fundamental formula in the Newton-Raphson method is: 
xl=xo-(f(xo)/f,(xo)) 
where xq is an initial approximation of a root of an equation, 
which is a function of x, and x^ is a closer approximation 
than xq. In order to apply the Newton-Raphson method in ap¬ 
proximating a root of equation (7), the first derivative of 
the function with respect to q must be computed: 
f ■ (q) = U(q) (-4><q))-(i-*<q))*' (q)/<f(q)2-i) 
f' (q) = (-2- ( (l-<f (q) ) (q))/$(q)2) • (8) 
Combining equations (7) and (8) in the fundamental formula 
for the Newton-Raphson method: 
1-* (qQ) ) /<*> (qQ) “ (qQS+M+l) /S 
qi ^ (-2-((l-<D(qo)) <f>' (qQ) ) / 4> (qQ) ^ (9) 
Equation (8) is the first derivative, with respect to q, of 
equation (7) and it is therefore also the second derivative, 
with respect to q, of equation (1), since q is a function of 
33 
of B . Therefore second order conditions for a maximum can 
o 
be checked by observing the sign of equation (8). If the 
second derivative is negative, the root obtained by utilizing 
this approximation will maximize equation (1). 
Model II 
In this approach it will be assumed that the probability 
distribution of each competitor's bid to cost ratio is normal 
with parameters which can be estimated from historic bidding 
data. It will be assumed that the bid to cost ratios among 
the competitors are independent. Let (B^/C) be the bid to 
th 
cost ratio of the iu competitor, where: 
(Bi/C)'^N(ui, ck2) 
The bidder's bid to cost ratio will be denoted by Bq/C. 
The probability that the bidder wins a contract with a bid 
of Bq/C is equal to the probability that each competitor's 
bid to cost ratio is greater than (Bq/C). Assuming indepen¬ 
dence among the competitor bid to cost ratios, the probabil¬ 
ity that the bidder wins a contract with a bid ratio of 
(Bq/C) is equal to the probability that each competitor bid 
ratio is above (Bq/C), which is equal to the product of the 
probabilities that each competitor bid ratio is above (Bq/C). 
Define the following cumulative probability function for 
each competitor: 
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G . (x)=?(2nS. 2) ^exp-ist ( (B./O-M. )/S. ) 2d(B./C) , 
15./^ 1 1111 
* 1 X 
where S. and M. are unbiased estimators of a. and y.. The 
ii i i 
density function for each competitor will be defined as: 
gB /c(x) = (2'rTSi2)~^exP_i5( (x-Mi)/Si)2. 
i' 
th 
The probability that the l competitor's bid to cost ratio 
is greater than the bidder's is therefore equal to: 
G_ ,r (B /C) = • 7 (2*S.2) ^exp-m ( (B./C)-M. )/S. )2d(B./C) . 
Bi/C °B/C1 1111 
o 
Under the assumption of independence, the probability that 
the bidder wins a contract with a bid ratio of (B /C), when 
competing against n competitors, is equal to the product- of 
the n cumulative probability functions: 
the probability 
that a contract 
is won with a 
ratio of (Bq/C) 
GBi/C <VC) -GB2/C (Bo/C) • • -GBn/C (VC) 
gb./c(Vc)- 
1 = 1 1 
The profit which the bidder will receive from a contract 
with a cost of C for which a bid to cost ratio of (Bq/C) is 
selected can be expressed as: 
(Bo-C) if Bo/C<B1/C,B2/C, • • • Bn/C 
0 otherwise. 
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The expected monetary value of the profit from a contract 
for a bid of Bq is therefore equal to: 
E(P) = (B -C) n GB (Bo/C) 
1=1 1 
(10) 
Taking the logarithms of both sides of equation (10): 
n 
Log(E(P))=Log(B -C)+ Z Log(GB /c(Bq/C)). (11) 
i=l i' 
A value of Bq which maximizes equation (11) will also yield a 
maximum value of equation (10). Taking the first derivative 
of equation (11), with respect to Bq, yields: 
d'Log'E'P’U -c|_ 
O 1 = 1 
n 
Z (g B./C ^Bo^C^GB. /C (VC) * 
l l' 
(12) 
Setting equation (12) equal to zero and solving for a root, 
B *, will yield a value of B which results in an extreme 
o J o 
value of equation (10). Setting equation (12) equal to zero: 
0=1/ (B -C) - (I/O ? (g /c (B0/C) /Gb /c (B /C) ) 
1 = 1 1 1 
Dividing the numerator and the denominator of the first term 
in equation (13) by C: 
0= (1/C) / ( (Bq/C) -1) - (1/C) 
0=1/((B /C)-l)- Z (g 
° i=l Bi/C 
.Z (gB./C (B0//C)/,GB./C 





Letting y equal the bidder's bid to cost ratio of B /C and 
o 
substituting y into equation (14): 
n 
(15) 
equation (15) can be expressed as a function of the variable 
y as shown: 
n 
f(y)=l/(y-l)-_^<9B./c(y)/GBi/c(y))• (16) 
The ratio of the ordinate to the right tail area, as con¬ 
tained in the summation in equation (16) for each competi¬ 
tor, is referred to as the hazard function, where: 
H(x)~f(x)/(l-F(x)) 
Equation (16) can therefore be re-expressed in the form: 
n 
f(y)=l/(y-l)- i hb /c(y)- 
i=l i' 
(17) 
The value of y for which f(y) is zero yields an extreme value 
of equation (10). The first derivative of equation (17), 
with respect to y, would indicate the curvature of equation 
(10). If the first derivative of equation (17) is negative 
in the region of the curve around the optimal bid, the curve 
defined by equation (10) is concave in this same region and 
the root is therefore a maximum. 
The Newton-Raphson method can be employed in approxi¬ 
mating a root of equation (17), for which f(y) equals zero. 
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The first derivative of equation (17), with respect to y, 
is: 
f'(y)=(-1/(y-1)2)- z H* /r(y). 
i=l Bi/C 
Assuming an initial approximation of the root of y , the 
first iteration would yield a second approximation of: 
n n 
y1-yo+(1/(yo-1,-.S1HBV (y ))/(l/(y -D-+ r H' v (y )) 
1 = 1 1 1=1 1 
where: 
(18) 
HBi/C(y) gBi/C '/GBi/C 
H,B./C^y)=(GB./C(y)g,B./C(y)+gB./c(y) )^GB./C(y) * 
l l l l l 
The approximation of a root of equation (17) would yield a 
root of equation (10), Bq*, if second order conditions are 
satisfied. The second order conditions for a maximum would 
require that the second derivative of equation (10), with 
respect to Bq, be negative. This condition would be satis¬ 
fied if the first derivative of equation (17), which is con¬ 
tained in the denominator of the second term in equation 
(18), is negative. 
Model III 
In this model it will be assumed that the bid to cost 
ratio of each competitor is generated by a normal regression 
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process with unknown parameters. The bid to cost ratio of 
th th 
the i competitor on the j contract will be defined by 
y^j. Assume that is generated by the following regres¬ 
sion model: 
y. .=B.n+B.,x, .+B.~x~.+ * * * +B.,x, .+e. . 
-*13 1O ll I3 i2 23 lk k3 13 
Where: Y.. is a typical value of Y.the bid to cost 
13 13' 
ratio of the i^ competitor on the j*'*1 contract, 
the dependent variable, i=l,2. , n and 
j=l/2, ,m 
BiO'Bil'* * *'Bik are P°Pulati°n Partial re- 
th 
gression coefficients of the 1 competitor; 
Xlj'X2j' 
,x, . are the observed values char- 
k} 
acteristics, of the k independent variables 
th 
for the j contract. 
The following assumptions will be made: 
1. The (x, . ,x0 . , 
ID 23' 
,x^j) terms are fixed vari- 
. th 
ables associated with the j contract, whose values 
are known to the bidder prior to submitting a bid. 
2. For each combination of the (xij,x2j/ 
terms, there exists a normally distributed sub- 
th 
population of Y^^ values for the 1 competitor on 
the contract. 
3. The variances of the subpopulations of are 
equal for all combinations of i and j. 
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4. The values are independent for each combin¬ 
ation of i and j. 
5. The e^j values are normally distribued indepen¬ 
dent random variables with mean zero and variance 
o^. for the i competitor. 
The least squares estimate of BiQ/Bil' ,Bik)/ for the i 
th 
competitor, can be obtained by minimizing the sum of the 
squared error terms for a sample of m historic bids with re¬ 
spect to 'Bii• * */Bik^‘ T^e sum s<3uare<3 error 








(y. .-B.a-B.,x, .-B.0xn. 
ij lO ll lj i2 2j -B. .x, . 13 ko 
The solution to this minimization leads to the following, sam- 
t h t h 
pie regression equation for the i competitor on the j 
contract: 
y =b. +b.,x. .+b.0x0.+ 
Jc 10 ll lj i2 2j 
+b.. x. 
lk kj 
The y . . term is an unbiased point estimator of the mean bid 
i ^ 
to cost ratio of the l competitor on the j contract. 
The variance of the distribution of bid to cost ratios for 
the l competitor on the j contract can be estimated by 
the estimate of the variance of the subpopulation of nev; y^ 
values for a given set of values of the independent vari¬ 
ables from the least squares regression line. The estimate 
2 
of the variance of the new y^^ values, S (y^j(new))/ will 
40 
be written as S (y^jn)• The distribution of the statistic 
(y. .-y . . )/s(y. . ) can be approximated by a student's t dis- 
x ^ O X X J XX 
tribution with (n-k-1) degrees of freedom. A normal approxi¬ 
mation of the distribution can be used for (n-k-1)>30. 
The profit to be received from contract j, when m known 






if y . <yn . /y0 ., 
*03 J I3 23 
otherwise. 
m3 
Where: y .=B ./C. (the bidder's bid to cost ratio for the 
*oj 03 3 
j*"*1 contract) . 
The expected value of contract j is therefore equal to: 
E (P .) = (B . -c .) G (y .) G (v •) 
3 03 3 y-Lj y2j “ 03 
G . (y .) 
ym3 03 
m 
E (P .) = (B .-C .) H G y .) . 
3 03 3. , y . . 03 J j j 1=i -> 
(19) 
Where: G (y > = 7 (2»S (Yijn) )-Isexp-ii( (yij-y ij)/S(yijn)) 2dyij 
J J J OJ 
Equation (19) is equivalent to equation (10) contained in the 
discussion of Model II. The value of BQj which maximizes 
equation (19) can be approximated by application of the 
Newton-Raphson method, as developed in Model II. Taking the 
logarithm of both sides of equation (19), and setting the 
first derivative with respect to Bqj, equal to zero yields: 
m d(Log(E(P .)) 7 A 
itb I 1 -i/<Vrc:i,-|1/ej,1f19yi) '' Hily°i' 
(20) 
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Dividing the numerator and denominator of the first term by 
Cj and multiplying the equation by yields: 
0=1/(y .-1)- Eg (y . )/G (v .) 
°3 i=l yij 03 yij °J 
(21) 
Re-expressing equation (21) in terms of the hazard function 
and writing ecaation (22) as a function of v .: 
^ "03 
n 
0=1/(y .-1)- EH (y .)=f(y .) 
~°d i=1 y±j -03 *03 
(22) 
The first derivative of equation (22) equals 
m 
f1 (y -) = (-l/(v -1) )- E K' (y .). 
'03 -03 i=1 y±j *03 
Where: H » , o o 
3ij *oj (Gv.. Joj - v..(v .)+<j (y .) )/G (y .). 
J J -13 J *13 03 Y±j yij 03 
The first iteration of the Newton-Raphson method would yield 
an approximation o S- . 
n m 
W - J1“,ij >/U/<YoJ-U *1‘1“'yi),yo), , . 
(23) 
Each subsequent iteration will yield a value of closer to 
the optimal bid, for equation (19) reaches an ac¬ 
tual extreme value. The curvature of equation (19) in the 
neighborhood of the extreme value can be checked by obser¬ 
ving the sign of the derivative of equation (22), which is 
contained in the denominator of the second term in equation 
(23) . 
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In each of these models the underlying approach has 
been to express the optimal bid ratio in an equation whose 
roots can be approximated by numerican methods. The compu¬ 
tation of the iterative formulae for approximating this op¬ 
timal bid ratio, equations (9), (18) and (23) , can be sim¬ 
plified by the tablization of several of the terms contained 
therein. This tablization for ease of computation, will be 
presented in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 4 
THE DESIGN OF BIDDING TABLES FOR CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACT BIDDING 
Computation of an approximation of the optimal bid ratio 
by use of the models presented in the previous chapter, can 
be facilitated by the combination and tablization of several 
of the terms contained in equations (9), (18), and (23). 
The use of such tables will permit rapid computation of the 
first iteration and therefore a quick approximation of the 
optimal bid ratio. 
For model one, the first iteration would yield an ap¬ 
proximation which is based upon an initial guess, expressed 
as a number of standard deviations from the mean of the low¬ 
est competitor bid to cost ratios, and a function of the ini¬ 
tial guess. Restating equation (9): 
(1-$(qQ))/$(qo)-(qQS+M-l)/S 
^ ^ (-2-((l-4.(qo))4>'(qo))A(qo)2) 
In this expression, qQ denotes an initial guess at the num¬ 
ber of standard deviations from the mean, and q^ represents 
a second approximation, which is closer than qQ to the value 
of q which maximizes the expected value of the profit from 
the contract. The terms: 
(l-4>(qo) )/4,(qo) and (-2-( (1-t (qQ) ) 4 ' (qQ) )/* <qQ) 2) 
are functions of the initial guess, qQ. Expressing these 
terms as functions u and v, respectively, of qQ, equation 
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(9) can be rewritten as follows: 
u(qo)-(qoS+M-l)/S 
ql"qo v(qQ) . 
The functions u and v have been computed for qQ values rang¬ 
ing from -2.39 to 2.39 and are contained in Appendix I. 
As an example of the application of model one, consider 
the case in which a contractor must decide on a dollar value 
of a bid to be submitted on a contract which has an estimated 
cost of $50,000. Assume that historic bidding data indicates 
that the distribution of lowest competitor bid to cost ratios 
is approximately normal with a mean of 1.1 and a standard de¬ 
viation of .20. By computing the probability of winning and 
the expected value of the profit for a range of possible 
bids, the optimal bid can be approximated. For this example, 
the results of such an enumeration process are shown in 
Table 1. This enumeration indicates that the bid which maxi¬ 
mizes the expected value of the profit is $59,000, for an ex¬ 
pected profit of $3,101. The value of q which equates equa¬ 
tion (7) to zero is the value of q which will maximize the 
expected value of the profit. This value of q which equates 
equation (7) to zero can be determined graphically, as shown 
in Figure (1), where f(g) equals zero for q equal to .42, 
which would be a bid of $59,200 and an expected profit of 
$3,102. Each of these methods provides a means to obtain a 
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Graph of equation (7) 
f (q) 
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In applying model one, equation (24) can be used to ap¬ 
proximate the optimal bid to cost ratio, and therefore the 
optimal bid. It is necessary to initialize the model with 
a crude approximation of the optimal bid to cost ratio. For 
this example, assume that the first approximation was 1.1, 
or $55,000, this bid to cost ratio would be equal to the mean 
of the lowest competitor bid to cost ratios, therefore qQ 
equals zero. 
Applying model one, equation (24), the first iteration 
would be: 
n 1.25345-.50 ~>nrn 
ql=0--2~70- = -3767' 
The dollar value of a bid .3767 standard deviations above the 
mean of the lowest competitor bid to cost ratios equals: 
(1.1+.3767(.2))$50,000=$58,767. 
This bid yields an expected value of the profit of: 
($58,767-$50,000).3520=$3,085.98. 
Iterating a second time: 
q2= -38~ ~ 9-x^=.38+. 0416=.4216 
The dollar value of the bid and the expected profit for a q 
value of .4216 would be: 
(1.1+.4216(.2))$50,000=$59,216 
($59,216-$50,000).3372=$3,107.63. 
A third iteration indicates that this value is close to the 
actual maximum value of the expected profit: 
50 
q =.42- • 9-f3vv9-;-7~ =-42+. 0019=. 4219. 
3 -1.61237 
The dollar value of the bid and the expected profit for a 
value of q of .4219: 
(1.1+.4219(.2))$50/000=$59,219 
($59/219-$50/000).3372=$3/108.65. 
The first iteration yielded an approximation which was within 
$300 of the optimal bid as computed graphically, by enumera¬ 
tion, and by three iterations. 
For models two and three, the optimal bid to cost ratio 
will be the value of the bid to cost ratio, y, which equates 
equations (15) and the equivalent equations (22) to zero. 
Approximations of this optimal bid to cost ratio can be ob¬ 
tained by iterating equation (18) or the equivalent equation 
(23). Restating equation (18): 
n n 
yl=yo+(1/(yo-1) .Z.HB./C(yo))/(1/(yo"1) +.Z.H,B./C(yo 
1=1 1 1=1 1 
) ) 
In this expression yQ is an initial approximation of the op¬ 
timal bid ratio, the value of y which satisfies equations 
(15) and (22) , and y^ is a closer approximation. The term 
H /„(Y ) is the hazard function of competitor i and 
i th 
H' /r.(y ) is the first derivative of the i competitor.'s 
B. /C o 
l 
hazard function with respect to yQ. The hazard function, 




The derivative of the. hazard function H' (y) , is a function 
of the density function, the cumulative density, and the 
first derivative of the density: 
H' (y) = (G (y) g ' (y) +g (y) 2) /G (y) 2 . 
Values of H(y) and H'(y), for a particular density function, 
are therefore functions of the parameters of the density 
function and the value y. In the case of a normal density, 
values of H(y) and H'(y) will be defined for values of the 
mean, standard deviation, and y. The value yQ contained in 
equation (18) is the initial approximation of the optimal bid 
to cost ratio. If the same initial value, y , is assumed 
each time that the model is used, values of H(y) and H'(y) 
can be tablized for combinations of values for the mean and 
standard deviation. Appendix II contains values of H(y) and 
H'(y) for combinations of the mean and standard deviation 
ranging from 1.00 to 1.30 and .01 to .40, respectively, for 
a y value of 1.1. 
J o 
This initial value of y of 1.1 was chosen because em- 
o 
pirical evidence has indicated that the lowest competitor 
bids are on average approximately ten percent above the 
bidder's cost estimate. The mean of a sample of thirty-six 
lowest competitor bid to cost ratios was 1.092. Therefore 
an initial approximation of 1.1 would be expected to be 
close to the optimal bid ratio. The range of the mean in¬ 
cludes all feasible values for the mean bid to cost ratio for 
any competitor. A competitor would not be expected, on 
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average, to bid below the bidder's cost, nor on average more 
than twice the bidder's cost. In the selection of values 
for the range of standard deviations, it was reasoned that 
a standard deviation of less than .01 would indicate incre¬ 
dibly consistent bidding behavior, which would be unlikely, 
and a value greater than .3 would extend the ninety-five per¬ 
cent confidence limits beyond the range of feasible bids for 
any value of the mean. 
As an example of the application of the tables con¬ 
tained in Appendix II, consider the case of bidding against 
three competitors with the following parameters of their re¬ 
spective bid to cost ratio distributions: 
Competitor Mean Standard Deviation 




3 1.15 .12 
It will be assumed that the distributions are normal. The 
bidder's objective would be to select the bid which maximizes 
the expected value of the profit resulting from the contract, 
given the above competitor parameters. This expected value 
for a bid of can be expressed as: 
3 
E (P) = (B . -C) n G / (B./C) . 
1 k=l Bk/C 1 
where Gg /c^B^/C) represents the probability that the bid to 
k 
cost ratio of competitor k exceeds B^/C. 
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Assume that the bidder is bidding against the above com¬ 
petitors on a contract with an estimated cost of $80,000. 
The expected value of the profit resulting from the contract 
for a bid range of $83,840 to $87,120 is presented in Table 
2. .This enumeration of a selected range of bids indicates 
that the optimal bid is approximately $85,700 with an expected 
value of the profit of $1,103. 
% 
An approximation of this optimal bid can be computed 
from equation (18): 
n n 
yl=y0+(1/(yo-1)”.1,HB./C(yo>)/(1/(yo'l' +.Z1H'B./C(yo)- 
1=1 1 1=1 1 
Assuming an initial value of yQ of 1.1, equation (18) becomes 
n n 
y^l.l+UO- E Hb . (1.1))/(100+ Z H* 7 (1.1)). 
i=l i/ i=i j/ 
Values of , (1.1) and H'B (1.1) are tablized in Appendix 
a i. i' 
II for selected values of the mean and standard deviation of 
competitors' probability distributions of their respective 
bid to cost ratios. 
The appropriate values of ,£,(1.1) and H' B (1.1) for 
l' i' 
the three competitors, in this sample, obtained from Appendix 
II are shown in Table 3. As shown in Table 3, the iteration 
described in equation (18) would yield a second approximation 
of the optimal bid to cost ratio of 1.067. A bid to cost 
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Referring to Table 2, a bid of $85,360 would have an expected 
profit of $1,099 or within $4 of the expected value resulting 
from a bid of $85,700, obtained by means of the enumeration 
method. One iteration using this approximation technique, 
therefore, results, in a close approximation of the optimal 
bid to cost ratio. It should be noted also that the degree 
of difficulty in applying the approximation technique does 
not increase with the number of bidders, as does the enumera¬ 
tion method. 
The accuracy of the approximation method used in models 
one and two was demonstrated by comparing the bids computed 
by application of the bidding tables with computer simulated 
optimal bids. Fifty simulated bidding problems were gener¬ 
ated by randomly choosing five pairs of means and standard 
deviations and computing the bid which maximizes the expected 
value of the bid for a cost estimate of $80,000. The means 
and standard deviations for each simulated set of five com¬ 
petitors were used to compute an approximation of the opti¬ 
mal bid by using model two and the tables contained in Ap¬ 
pendix II. A summary of the results is displayed in Table 4. 
For the contract with an estimated cost of $80,000, the av¬ 
erage absolute value of the difference between the model bid 
and the bid which actually maximizes the expected value was 
$33.46. On average the approximated optimal bid deviated 
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CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL TESTS OF THE ASSUMPTIONS 
IN THE MODELING APPROACHES 
The models described in Chapter 3 will be applicable in 
selecting an optimal bid provided that the assumptions under 
which the models were developed are valid. In applying model 
one, it is assumed that the distribution of lowest competitor 
bid to cost ratios is normal. For model two it is assumed 
that the probability distribution of bid to cost ratios is 
normal for each competitor. An assumption of the independence 
of competitor bid to cost ratios is necessary in applying mo¬ 
dels two and three. 
In order to test these assumptions, and hence the under¬ 
lying validity of the modeling approach, actual bidding data 
was collected on past bids submitted by a heavy construction 
contractor in the state of Rhode Island. The company is in¬ 
volved in heavy roadwork construction and is an active bidder 
on state and municipal road and sewer contracts. The manager 
of the firm, who has the sole responsibility for bidding on 
contracts, agreed beforehand to cooperate in sharing his re¬ 
collections and records on past contracts. Data on sixty- 
eight contracts, on which the company had submitted bids, 
were collected from the public records of the state depart¬ 
ment of transportation and from the minutes of the meetings 
of contract review boards of four cities within the state. 
The data consisted of the identify and the value of the bid 
61 
of each contractor participating in the bid. In all cases 
the contract was awarded to the lowest bidder. 
The company keeps a file on each contract on which it 
submits a bid. These files contain copies of the contract 
specifications, labor and material estimates, and rough 
scratch work which was used in computing the bid. With this 
recorded data and the personal recollection of the manager, 
a cost estimate was determined for each of the sixty-eight 
contracts. The price bid by the company and its competitors 
and this cost estimate for each contract are contained in Ap¬ 
pendix, III. Each contractor was assigned a letter to pre¬ 
serve their anonymity and still allow for further classifica¬ 
tion and analysis. The cooperating company was assigned the 
letter A. 
Based upon contractor A's estimated cost, a ratio of 
their respective bid to this estimated cost, was computed for 
each contractor. Values of these ratios also appearin Appen¬ 
dix III. The values of the lowest competitor bid to cost 
ratios for each of the sixty-eight contracts, and the sample 
mean and standard deviation are presented in Appendix IV. 
For model one, it is assumed that the probability distribu¬ 
tion of these lowest competitor bid to cost ratios is normal. 
A test of the null hypothesis that this distribution is nor¬ 
mal was conducted, based upon the sample data contained in 
Appendix IV. 
62 
A modified chi-square test for goodness of fit to a nor¬ 
mal distribution was performed on the data presented in Ap¬ 
pendix IV. The data contained in Appendix IV were grouped 
into eight equiprobable class intervals, which are shown in 
Table 5. Since the formation of the intervals was based up¬ 
on estimates of the mean and variance of the parent distri¬ 
bution which were obtained from the sample, a modified chi- 
square value was used in testing the hypotheses. The use of 
the modified test statistic is appropriate when the class 
bounds are random. The asymptotic distribution of this modi- 
2 
fied statistic, X , is described in an article by Dahiya and 
K. 
16 2 
Gurland. Computation of the X statistic for the data con- 
tained in Appendix IV is shown in Table 5. The critical 
value of the statistic, for an alpha level of .05 and eight 
classes, is 11.543. Since the test.statistic computed from 
2 
the sample, XD (5.4117) is less than the critical value, 
d. Qe- (11 • 543) , the null hypothesis of normality was not re- 
jected. It can therefore be concluded that the sample evi¬ 
dence does not indicate that the distribution of the lowest 
competitor bid to cost ratios is not normal. 
In applying model two, it is assumed that the probabil- * 
ity distribution of each competitor's bid to cost ratios is 
normal. The sample bidding data on the sixty-eight contracts 
contained in Appendix III includes 311 competitor bid to cost 
^Ram Dahiya and John Gurland, "Pearson Chi-Squared Test 
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ratios for 54 contractors. The range of the number of bid 
to cost ratios for individual competitors is from one to 
twenty-five. There were eleven competitors against which 
competitor A bid more than ten times in the sixty-eight sam¬ 
ple bids. The bidding data for these eleven competitors 
were chosen to test the assumption of normality of the indi¬ 
vidual bid to cost ratio distributions. Appendix V contains 
a frequency distribution, a histogram, sample mean and sample 
standard deviation for each of the eleven competitors for 
which there were more than ten sample bids. 
An analysis of variance test for normality was conducted 
on each of the eleven samples contained in Appendix V. The 
test is based upon a statistical procedure discussed in an 
17 
article by Shapiro and Wilk. Derivation of the test sta¬ 
tistic, W, and percentage points of its null distribution 
are contained in the article. The denominator of the test 
statistic is the sum of the squared deviations of the order 
2 
statistics from the sample mean, S , where: 
2 n - 2 
s = z (y-y) 
i=l 1 
2 
The numerator of the test statistic, b , is the square of 
the weighted sum of the differences between decreasing ex¬ 
treme values of the sample: 
17S.S. Shapiro and M.B. Wilk, "An Analysis of Variance 






a • ■ i n-i+1 (y n-i+1 
where the values of the weights, an_^+^/ are provided in a 
18 
table contained in the article describing the test. 
Computation of the test statistic, W, for each of the 
eleven samples is presented in Table 6. Low values of the 
test statistic are indicative of the non-normality of the 
parent distribution. Percentage points from the ull distri¬ 
bution for an alpha level of .05 are displayed with the com¬ 
puted value of the test statistic in Table 6. In six of the 
* 
eleven cases the sample data did not provide sufficient evi¬ 
dence to reject the hypothesis of normality. Although the 
evidence was not strongly supportive, it would appear that 
the assumption of the normality of the individual bid to cost 
ratio distributions is tenable. 
In the sixty-eight recorded bids in Appendix III, compe¬ 
titor A bid less than ten times against 43 competitors. Of 
these, 32 were non-union contractors, 15 of which competitor 
A bid against once in the sixty-eight sample bids. Since 
competition against these competitors, on an individual ba¬ 
sis, is infrequent, for the purpose of applying model two, 
these competitors can be grouped together and it can be assumed 
that they bid individually as an average non-union or average 
union competitor infrequently encountered. The bidding data. 
18 
Ibid. 
TABLE 6. Analysis of variance test for normality of the 
distribution of individual competitor bid to cost ratios 





1 .5359(1.620- .986) = .33976 
2 .3325(1.271- .995) = .09177 
3 .2412(1.214-1.038) = .04245 
4 .1707 (1.126-1.0940 = .00546 
5 .1099(1.121-1.103) = .00198 
6 .0539(1.120-1.117) = .00016 
b = .48158 
b2 = .23192 









1 .4886(1.740- .980) = .37134 
2 .3253(1.683-1.072) = .19876 
3 .2553(1.342-1.076) = .06791 
4 .2027(1.310-1.099) = .04277 
5 .1587(1.273-1.104) = .02682 
6 .1197(1.205-1.112) = .01113 
7 .0837(1.193-1.136) = .00477 
8 .0496(1.170-1.154) = .00079 





.52464 S2= .67312 
W 05 W .77942 
.897 
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TABLE 6 (continued). Analysis of variance test for normality 
of the distributions of individual competitor bid to cost 
ratios for eleven competitors. 
Competitor C 
(n=25) 





































b = .63151 
b2 = .39880 S2=.42868 





1 .5251(1.253- .986) — .14020 
2 .3318(1.185-1.040) = .04811 
3 .2460(1.183-1.052) = .03223 
4 .1802(1.167-1.064) = .01856 
5 .1240(1.130-1.078) — .00645 
6 .0727(1.126-1.082) = .00320 
7 .0240(1.122-1.119) = .00007 
b — .24882 
b2 — .06191 s2=.06294 
W = .98364 
W.05 = ’874 
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TABLE 6 (continued). Analysis of variance test for normality 
of the distributions of individual competitor bid to cost ra¬ 
tios for eleven competitors. 
Competitor M 
(n= 2 2) 
i 
an-i+l^n-i+1 ^i^ 
1 .4590(1.750- .972) — .31120 
2 .3156(1.593- .983) = .19252 
3 .2571 (1.470-1.043) = .10978 
4 .2131(1.404-1.046) — .07629 
5 .1764(1.330-1.073) = .04533 
6 .1443(1.180-1.076) — .01501 
7 .1150(1.168-1.102) — .00759 
8 .9878 (1.164-1.104) — .00527 
9 .0618 (1.151-1.118) = .00204 
10 .0368 (1.148-1.125) = .00088 
11 .0122(1.145-1.137) = .00010 
b = .76601 
b2 — .58677 S2=.71114 





1 .4968(1.614- .888) .36068 
2 .3273(1.573- .959) = .20096 
3 .2540(1.549- .961) — .14935 
4 .1988(1.521- .999) = .10377 
5 .1524(1.308-1.035) — .04161 
6 .1109(1.288-1.068) = .02440 
7 .0725(1.240-1.071) — .01225 
8 .0359(1.176-1.118) = .00208 
b — .89510 
b2 = .80120 S2=.8784 
W = .91176 W.05 = -892 
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TABLE 6 (continued). Analysis of variance test for normality 
of the distributions of individual competitor bid to cost 
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b = .32930 
b2 = .10844 S =.12133 
W = .89376 W .05 
= .874 
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TABLE 6 (continued). Analysis of variance test for normality 
of the distributions of individual competitor bid to cost 





1 .4643(1.670- .999) — .31155 
2 .3185 (1.539-1.107) = .13759 
3 .2578 (1.495-1.120) = .09668 
4 .2119(1.464-1.139) = .06887 
5 .1736 (1.434-1.166) = .04652 
6 .1399 (1.386-1.195) = .02672 
7 .1092 (1.317-1.207) — .01201 
8 . 0804 (1.296-1.240) = .00450 




b — .70719 
b2 zz .50012 S2=.51878 





























b = .36982 
b2 = .13677 S2=.16793 
W W .81445 .05 
.892 
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TABLE 6 (continued). Analysis of variance test for normality 
of the distributions of individual competitor bid to cost 





1 .5359(1.353- .962) zz .20954 
2 . 3325 (1.242-1.039) =s .06750 
3 .2412(1.230-1.069) — .03883 
4 .1707 (1.216-1.104) = .01912 
5 .1099(1.146-1.113) = .00363 
6 .0539(1.135-1.121) .00075 
b = .33937 
b2 — .11517 S2=.11908 
W = .96716 W.05 = -866 
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from Appendix III, on these 43 competitors were grouped 
together for union and non-union contractors and appear in 
Appendices VI and VII in a frequency distribution and Histo¬ 
gram with the associated sample mean and standard deviation. 
In order to utilize these parameters of an average union or 
non-union competitor in applying model two, it is necessary 
to assume that the distribution of the respective population 
is normal. 
Modified chi-square tests for goodness of fit to a nor¬ 
mal distribution were performed on the data presented in Ap- 
* 
pendices VI and VII. The computation of the test statistic, 
2 
X , and the corresponding critical value for an alpha level 
of .05, are presented in Tables 7 and 8. The null hypothesis 
of the normality of the distribution of bid to cost ratios 
for infrequently encountered non-union competitors was re¬ 
jected at the .05 level of significance. The normality hypo¬ 
thesis of the distribution of bid to cost ratios for infre¬ 
quently encountered union contractors was not rejected at 
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An assumption necessary for the application of model 
three is that the bid to cost ratios of each individual com¬ 
petitor are generated by a normal regression process. Under 
this assumption, the predicted dependent variables in each 
regression model will be normally distributed random varia¬ 
bles. In the basic regression model for each competitor: 
Y.. = B.n + B ., x, . + B. 0x0 . + . . . B., x. . + e. . 
13 1O ll I3 i2 23 1k k3 13 
th th 
the error term, e^^, is for the 1 competitor on the j con¬ 
tract. The assumption of the normality of these error terms 
for each competitor, and hence the normality of the predicted 
bid to cost ratios, follows from the fact that the error terms 
represent the effects of many factors omitted from the model. 
If these omitted factors are mutually independent, the sum 
of these effects would approach a normal distribution as the 
number of factors becomes large, in accordance with the Cen- 
19 
tral Limit Theorem. 
The output of each of these regression models will con¬ 
sist of a predicted bid to cost ratio and a standard error 
of this predicted value. These values represent estimates 
of the mean and standard deviation of the subpopulation of 
bid to cost ratios for a particular set of independent varia¬ 
bles. These two values will provide the input required for 
the computation of an approximation of the optimal bid to 
19 John Neter and William Wasserman, Applied Linear Sta¬ 
tistical Models (Homewood, Illinois, 1974), 47. 
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cost ratio in a manner identical to that for model two de¬ 
scribed in Chapter IV. 
The data on the eleven competitors which were used to 
test the normality assumption required for model two were 
also used as the recorded values of the dependent variable 
in examining the appropriateness of the Regression approach 
of model three. Selection of the independent variables was 
constrained by the availability of historic data on the sixty- 
eight sample bids contained in Appendix III. The independent 
variables selected were; size of the contract expressed in 
* 
thousands of dollars, the number of bidders participating in 
the bid, the number of material suppliers participating and 
the number of non-union contractors participating. Each of 
these variables, which will be described subsequently, were 
considered as factors in selecting a bid by the manager of 
firm A. 
The size of the contract, as an independent variable, 
could reveal the underlying preference of individual contrac¬ 
tors for large or small work contracts. The capital outlay 
required for material, equipment and labor is directly propor¬ 
tional to the bid price of the contract. For financial con¬ 
siderations, therefore, it would be expected that smaller 
firms would bid more competitively on smaller contracts while 
participating in bidding on larger contracts with correspond¬ 
ingly higher bid to cost ratios. 
The number of bidders participating in the bid was in¬ 
troduced as an independent variable because of the suspected 
77 
increase in the degree of competitiveness associated with a 
large number of competitors. A general theory of bidding be¬ 
havior is that individual competitors lower their bids as the 
number of .-competitors increases. During recessionary periods 
in the construction trade, what work does become available is 
highly sought after and the number of contractors participat¬ 
ing in bidding on individual contracts increases. Conversely, 
when numerous contracts are available and fewer contractors 
are bidding on individual contracts, the bid to cost ratios 
would tend to be higher. 
In many of the roadwork construction contracts, as those 
4 
contained in Appendix III, the contractor is required to in¬ 
clude materials such as concrete, asphalt, gravel, sand or 
crushed stone in the bid price. Among the contractors bid¬ 
ding on the sixty-eight contracts with firm A, are six sup¬ 
pliers of such material. Whether this cost advantage is re¬ 
flected in the bid to cost ratios of these suppliers or whe¬ 
ther other bidders lower their bids in response to such compe¬ 
tition, could be revealed by using the number of such 
suppliers participating in the bidding as an independent 
variable in predicting individual bid to cost ratios. 
Contractors participating in the bids contained in Ap¬ 
pendix III were either union or non-union contractors. Union 
contractors hire only union members and pay union wages, 
while non-union contractors are under no wage restrictions. 
Non-union contractors are indicated in Appendix III by double 
78 
TABLE 9. Regression data for eleven contractors with bid 
to cost ratios as the dependent variable. 
Independent variables 
1 bid size in thousands of dollars 
2 number of bidders participating 
3 number of suppliers participating 
4 number of non-union contractors participating 
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.5017 Critical t for 12 d.f. 2.179 
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TABLE 9 (continued). Regression data for eleven contractors 
with bid to cost ratios as the dependent variable. 

































































1.69X104 1 .25X10~4 1.352 
.0118 .0250 .4737 
.0267 .0291 - .9171 
.0016 .0285 - .0544 
R2 = .1372 Critical t for 20 d.f. 2.086 
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TABLE 9 (continued). Regression data for eleven contractors 
with bid to cost ratios as the dependent variable. 






-4.20X10 5 1.44X10 4 - .2915 
.0171 .0733 .2327 
.0053 .0407 .1298 
- .0102 .0926 - .1099 


























































8 d.f. = 2.306 
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letters. The number of non-union contractors being bid 
against by Firm A was a consideration in selecting a bid. 
The number of non-union contractors participating in each 
ccrrract was therefore used as an independent variable in 
the regression formulation. 
The results of the eleven computed regression models are 
ccnmained in Table 9. The proportion of the total variation 
cf the dependent variable explained by the regression model 
2 
is urcicatec by the coefficient of determination, R . A re¬ 
duction in the total variation of the bid to cost ratios for 
each competitor, would cause a corresponding reduction in 
the standard error of the predicted bid to cost ratios. In 
model three, it is this standard error of the predicted bid 
to cost ratio which is used as an estimate of the standard de¬ 
viation of the distribution of bid to cost ratios, which is 
incorporated into the approximation technique as in model 
two. Any reduction in these standard error terms would im¬ 
prove the accuracy of the estimation of the probability of 
winning a contract with a particular bid. 
In each of the eleven cases, the four coefficients com¬ 
puted in the regression model were tested to determine if 
they differ significantly from zero. The computed t-ratio 
and the critical value of the t statistic, for a significance 
level of 95% and the appropriate number of degrees of free¬ 
dom, are shown in Table 10. The null hypothesis in each case 
was that population regression coefficient is equal to zero. 
82 
The null hypotheses of the equality of the true regression 
coefficients to zero was not rejected in all but four in¬ 
stances. This result indicates an apparent lack of predict¬ 
ability of these selected independent variables. Of the 
eleven regression models, four accounted for more than 50% 
of the variance of the dependent variable. 
In computing the probability of winning with a particu¬ 
lar bid in each of the three models, it is assumed that the 
probabilities of winning against each individual competitor 
are independent. If it is assumed that the joint probabil¬ 
ity distribution of the bid to cost ratios of any two compe¬ 
titors is a bivariate normal distribution, then the bid to 
cost ratios of the two competitors are independent if and 
only if the correlation coefficient, p, between the two vari¬ 
ables is equal to zero. For any joint distribution, indepen¬ 
dence implies that the correlation coefficient is equal to 
zero. For the bivariate normal distribution, the equality 
of the correlation coefficient to zero implies and is implied 
by the statistical independence of the two variables. 
The sample correlation coefficient, r, can be used to 
estimate p. Under the assumption of bivariate normality, 
the equality of the correlation coefficient to zero is equi¬ 
valent to the independence of the two variables. Testing 
the hypothesis of independence is therefore equivalent to 
testing the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient, 
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V' o k 
equal to zero. The test statistic (r(n-2) 2)/(l-r ) 2 has a 
t distribution with (n-2) degrees of freedom. This statistic 
can be used to test the hypothesis of independence. 
In order to utilize the date in Appendix III to test the 
assumption of independence, pairs of competitors were se¬ 
lected wbo bid against each other more often than others. 
There were six pairs of contractors who bid against each other 
more than six times in the sixty-eight sample bids. From the 
sample bidding data, a set of paired observations was recorded 
for each of the six pairs of competitors and appear in Appen¬ 
dix XI. 
A sample correlation coefficient and an associated t 
value were computed for each pair of competitors. These 
values of the correlation coefficient and t value are shown 
in Table 10, with the corresponding critical value of t for 
a level of significance of 95% and the respective number of 
degrees of freedom. In each of the six cases, the sample 
data did not provide sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of the equality of the correlation coefficient to 
zero. This result, wThile not proof of independence, would 
tend to substantiate the assumption cf independence which 
was necessary in the application of each of the models pre¬ 
sented previously. 
The fact that five of the six sample correlation coeffi¬ 
cients were positive could be attributed to the general 
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if all contractors were bidding high on a particular con¬ 
tract, all bid ratios would be high. This would contribute 
to the positive correlation.in bid ratios of the sample 
pairs of contractors. In order to remove the possible ef¬ 
fect of the magnitude of the bid ratios of all competitors 
on a particular contract from the correlation between the 
six sample pairs, the bid ratios were expressed as percentages 
of the average bid ratio on the respective contract. The 
paired values of these standardized bid to cost ratios for 
the six sample pairs of contractors appear in Appendix XII. 
The sample correlation coefficients and corresponding sample 
t values for these standardized bid ratios are shown in Table 
11 with the critical t value for an alpha of .05. The two- 
tailed tests of the hypotheses that the population correla¬ 
tion coefficient is equal to zero was not rejected in all but 
two cases. 
A comparison of the application of models one and two 
with competitor A's current method of bid selection was made 
by applying models one and two to the sixty-eight sample bids 
contained in Appendix III. A summary of the results of this 
comparison are shown in Table 12. Of the sixty-eight con¬ 
tracts bid on, competitor A won fourteen. Applying models 
one and two to compute a bid for each contract, resulted in 
twenty-seven and twenty-four winning bids respectfully. The 
total profit received under the current bidding method, based 
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upon estimated costs, was $220,807. The total profit result¬ 
ing from the application of model one was $532,662 and 
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POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS OF THE BIDDING MODELS 
The three models presented present a basis for quan¬ 
tifying the bidding decision and providing the decision 
maker with additional information in making a bid decision. 
The basic modeling approach and the approximation technique 
can be extended to include other applications and alternative 
assumptions. Many of the possible extensions would call for 
new research endeavors which would be beyond the scope of 
this present work. 
Model one was developed under the assumption that the 
distribution of lowest competitor bid to cost ratios is nor1- 
mal. Model two similarly was developed under the assumption 
that the distribution of each individual competitor's bid to 
cost ratios is normal. The tables contained in Appendices I 
and II were based upon these assumptions of normality. The 
numerical approximation techniques, upon which the tables are 
based, is not limited to the normal distribution. Similar 
tables could be generated for any assumed tractable distribu¬ 
tion. Although the data collected for this study did not 
cast doubt upon the assumptions of normality, the distribu¬ 
tions of other bidding data could possibly be more closely 
approximated with a gamma or log-normal probability distribu¬ 
tion. Both the gamma and log-normal distributions would 
allow for skewness in the distribution and a minimum value 
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of zero, characteristics which could be appropriate for the 
distribution of a random variable which is the ratio of two 
positive numbers. 
In each of the modeling approaches, it was assumed that 
the parameters of the respective distributions were fixed but 
unknown values. Sample data provided unbiased point estima¬ 
tors of these parameters. Without the basis of sample infor¬ 
mation, estimates of these parameters would be unavailable, 
unless the idea of an average bidder were employed. In prac¬ 
tice such a situation would arise each time the bidder en¬ 
countered a competitor which the bidder had not previously 
i 
bid against. The classical approach to estimating the para¬ 
meters would not provide a means for incorporating the models 
in such instances. An additional limitation of the classical 
approach to estimating the relevant parameters would be that 
additional data, drawn from the individual populations of 
competitor bid to cost ratios, would not alter the decision 
maker's knowledge or degree of belief about the parameters. 
A Bayesian approach to the estimation of the necessary 
parameters would allow for the incorporation of new competi¬ 
tors into the modeling approach and for the use of all avail¬ 
able data in the model. Formulation of prior distributions 
on the parameters to be estimated, would enable the decision 
maker to update these distributions upon the receipt of addi¬ 
tional bidding data. In the bidding process, the decision 
maker is in receipt of a continual inflow of free information 
on the bidding behavior of his competitors. Bayesian natural 
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conjugate theory would provide the decision maker with the 
mechanism for combining sample data with a prior distribution 
to form a posterior distribution which contains all the avail¬ 
able information about the relevant parameters. 
If it is assumed that the distribution of each competi¬ 
tor's bid to cost ratios is normal, an assumption which the 
data in this work have supported, then natural conjugate 
theory can be applied in estimating the distributions of 
these parameters. For purposes of exposition, assume that 
the distribution of an individual competitor's bid to cost 
ratios is normal with a mean M and a precision R. By natural 
conjugate theory, if M and R have a normal-gamma joint prior 
density, the posterior marginal density of M is a student's 
t distribution and the posterior marginal density of R is a 
gamma distribution. Specifically, if the conditional prior 
distribution of M, when R=r, is a normal distribution with 
mean y and precision xr and the marginal distribution of R 
is a gamma distribution with parameters a and B, then the pos¬ 
terior joint distribution of M and R is a normal-gamma, where 
the posterior conditional distribution of M when R=r is a nor¬ 
mal distribution with mean y' ("'" indicates a posterior 
parameter) and precision (x+n)r, where: 
u' = (xy+n(B/C))/(x+n) 
and the marginal distribution of R is a gamma distribution 




S'=B+^ E ( (B./C)-(B7C) 2+ --n4-rB-{-C- 
l 2(x+n) 
The posterior marginal distribution of M is a Student's t 
distribution with 2a' degrees of freedom, location parameter 
y' and precision a'-r'/B'. The prior marginal distribution of 
20 
M is equivalent using prior parameters a, 8, t, and y. 
The prior mean and variance of M and R can be estimated 
subjectively or from historical data. For example, if pre¬ 
vious lowest bid to cost ratios are grouped by quarters of 
the year in which they occurred for n years into the past, 
there would be 4(n) individual groups of lowest competitor 
bid to cost ratios for each competitor. The mean bid to cost 
_ 2 
ratio for each group, (B/C), and precision, (1/s ), could be 
computed and the means of these means and precisions could 
be used as prior estimates of E(m) and E(R). The variances 
of the means and precisions about E(M) and E(R), respectively, 
could be computed and used as prior estimates of Var(M) and 
Var(r). In the case of a new or not previously encountered 
competitor, subjective estimates of E(M), Var(M), E(R), and 
Var(R) could be used. These estimates could be based upon 
the updated distributions of competitors against which the 
bidder has had previous bidding experience, which have simi¬ 
larities to the new competitor. The posterior distributions 
20 
Morris H. DeGroot, Optimal Statistical Decisions (New 
York, 1970), 168-171. 
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would summarize all the available information which the bid¬ 
der possesses about each competitor. 
One aspect of the bidding decision for a construction 
contractor, which is not captured in the modeling approaches 
discussed in this work, is the contractor's "degree of hun¬ 
ger" for each pending contract. The degree of hunger is a 
term used to describe the strength of the firm's desire to 
win a particular contract. This measure is commonly related 
to the firm's current or projected workload, in terms of its 
personnel and equipment utilization. When personnel and 
equipment are idle, the winning of a contract, which would 
utilize these resources, would be more important to the firm 
than if these resources were engated in other work. This 
t 
slack in resource utilization is often taken up by bidding 
low on smaller contracts with close starting dates and short 
completion times. The lost profit on these contracts is com¬ 
pensated for by the utilization of the resources, which en¬ 
ables the firm to cover its fixed costs. The payoffs on such 
contracts, in terms of the profit as defined for the models 
in this work, do not reflect the true worth to the firm. 
This change in attitude toward the profit to be received 
from a contract when resources are underutilized, can be 
thought of as a movement along the firm's utility function. 
The firm's utility function can be found empirically by per¬ 
sonally interviewing the decision maker. The utility func¬ 
tion can be described graphically by the firm's preference 
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curve, drawn over the relevant range of potential asset posi¬ 
tions. Choosing the appropriate preference curve would 
enable the decision maker to assign an approximation of the 
true worth to the firm of winning or losing a bid on a parti¬ 
cular contract. 
Utilizing an appropriate utility function, utility 
values could be derived for values of the potential asset 
positions resulting from winning losing a bid on a contract. 
The expected utility of the contract would be expressed as: 
n n 
E(u(W))=u( (B -C)+$) IT Gb /C(B /C)-u($-X) (1- II G . (B /C) 
i=l 1' i=l °i/ 
i 
where u(W) is the firm's utility for contract W, $ is the 
firm's current asset position, and X is the decrease in as¬ 
sets resulting from underutilizing the firm's resources. An 
example of a possible preference curve is shown in Figure 3 
with values of the firm's asset position prior to the bid 
and after, if the contract is won and if the contract is lost. 
The utility values used in computing an optimal bid are there¬ 
fore dependent upon the firm's current asset position and 
level of resource utilization. 
Since the optimization models presented in this work are 
based upon the expected monetary value, introduction of a 
non-linear utility function into the model would require a 
variation of the optimization technique. If the utility 
function is determined empirically and described graphically, 
then utility values must be read directly from the curve. 
FIGURE 3 
Example utility function for a contractor's asset position 
Utility 




Asset position before bid 
Asset position if the bid is lost 
Asset position if the bid is won 
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In order to determine the optimal bid with modeling approaches 
similar to the ones described in this work, it would be neces¬ 
sary to work with utility functions expressed in analytical 
form. 
In each of the models discussed the bidder views each 
contract as if it were the only contract which the firm had 
to bid on, and bids to maximize the expected value of that 
contract. This treatment does not handle to problem of bid¬ 
ding on individual contracts whre the population of contracts 
available to the firm is much larger than the firm could exe¬ 
cute, if won. This compound probability problem is a logical 
extension of the work here presented. 
CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this dissertation was to develop quanti¬ 
tative models which could be applied to competitive bidding 
decisions in the construction industry. A central considera¬ 
tion was that the models developed would be applicable and 
suitable for implementation within the limitations of the 
actual business environment. Computer facilities are typi¬ 
cally not available to construction company managers for 
data analysis related to bidding decisions. Required data 
manipulation therefore has to be relatively simple and 
necessary data must be available from existing sources. 
Another important consideration was that the objective 
of the model had to be consistent w7ith the objective of the 
firms involved in bidding. Maximization of expected profit 
was used as the objective in each of the three models de¬ 
veloped. Although this objective may not be in precise 
agreement with the actual objective of the bidders, it 
provides the decision maker with an input to the bidding 
decision which can be acquired with minor computational 
effort. 
With the maximization of expected value of the bid as 
the objective in choosing a bid for each contract, mathema¬ 
tical models of the bidding process were developed. Three 
separate approaches were taken in constructing probabilistic 
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models. In each approach probability distributions of bid 
to cost ratios were assumed to be normal. 
The first approach was to assess the probability dis¬ 
tribution of the lowest competitor bid to cost ratios. This 
distribution was used in formulating an expected value expres 
sion. In order to determine the value of the bid which maxi¬ 
mizes the expected value expression, the first derivative of 
the function was taken with respect to the bid and this func- 
9 
tion was set equal to zero to solve for an extreme value. 
If the second order conditions are satisfied, a root of this 
expression would yield a maximum expected value. In order 
i 
to determine a root of this equation, a numerical approxima¬ 
tion technique was employed. Applying the Newton-Raphson 
method to the function, an iterative expression was derived 
for approximating the root of the equation. 
The second approach involved utilizing the probability 
distributions of individual competitors in deriving the joint 
probability distribution of competitor bid to cost ratios. 
This joint probability distribution of competitor bid ratios 
is utilized in formulating an expected value expression. In 
order to determine the bid which maximizes this expected 
value expression, the first derivative is set equal to zero 
and a numerical method was employed in approximating the 
root of the function. 
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The third approach involved utilizing the output of in¬ 
dividual normal regression models for each competitor in es¬ 
timating the mean and standard deviation of their respective 
bid to cost ratio distributions. An expected value expres¬ 
sion was developed with these estimated parameters and the 
Newton-Raphson approximation method was employed in estimating 
the optimal bid as in model two. 
For selected values of parameters of the assumed bid to 
cost ratio- distributions, terms contained in the iterative 
expressions derived for approximating the optimal bid, were 
computed and displayed in a table. These tables enable the 
decision maker to compute an approximation of the optimal 
bid using model one or model two with a few simple calcula- 
t 
tions. It was shown that this approximation method yields 
an estiamte which is, on average, within four one hundredths 
of one percent of the bid which maximizes the expected value. 
Actual bidding data was collected and used to test the 
assumptions under which the models were developed. The hy¬ 
pothesis of the normality of the distribution of lowest com¬ 
petitor bid to cost ratios was not rejected. Hypotheses of 
the normality of individual competitor bid to cost ratio 
distributions were tested for eleven competitors. Five of 
the eleven null hypotheses were rejected at a .05 level of 
significance. Similar hypotheses of the normality of bid to 
cost ratio distributions for union and non-union contractors 
were tested. The hypothesis of the normality of the 
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of non-union bid to cost ratios was not rejected, while the 
same hypothesis for union contractors was rejected. 
Sample regression equations were computed for elevan con¬ 
tractors using four independent variables. The sample re¬ 
gression coefficients were used to test the hypotheses that 
the population coefficients were equal to zero. Only four 
of the forty-four hypotheses were rejected. 
The assumption of independence among the individual com¬ 
petitor bid to cost ratio distributions was examined by test¬ 
ing hypotheses about the population correlation coefficients. 
The sample correlation coefficients for six pairs of competi¬ 
tors were used to test the hypotheses that the individual 
population correlation coefficients equal zero. In the six 
cases the null hypothesis was not rejected, supporting the 
assumption of the independence of the individual distribu¬ 
tions. When the bid ratios were standardized by dividing 
each ratio by the mean ratio for all competitors for the re¬ 
spective contract, two of the six hypotheses that the popula¬ 
tion correlation coefficient equalled zero were rejected. 
Models one and two were applied to the sixty-eight sam¬ 
ple bids to compute an approximation of the optimal bid using 
the estimated cost and the parameter estimates computed from 
the sample. The number of contracts won increased from the 
actual value of 17 to 27 for model one and 24 for model two. 
Total profits increased from $220,807, to $532,622, for 
model one and to $393,346, for model two. The average profit 
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per contract won was $15,772, under the existing system of 
bidding, $19,728, for model one, and $16,598 for model two. 
The models are not restricted to the normal probability 
distribution, which is assumed in the analytical work. The 
approximation technique and use of computational tables 
could be adapted to any tractable probability distributions. 
A Bayesian approach to estimating the parameters of the pro¬ 
bability distributions would add a dimension to the modeling 
approach in allowing the decision maker to utilize all avail¬ 
able new information in pudating the parameters of the rele¬ 
vant probability distributions and in incorporating new com¬ 
petitors into the model. The models discussed are based 
upon the assumption of a linear utility function. Application 
t 
of a non-linear preference for the potential payoffs may be 
more applicable in certain instances in the bidding decision 
when the potential payoff from the contract does not reflect 
the true value to the firm of winning the contract. 
Both models one and two provide the decision maker 
with a means of computing an approximation of the bid which 
maximizes the expected value of the contract with little 
computational effort. The assumptions under which the 
models were developed appear to be valid and the accuracy 
of the approximation technique is significant, in the con¬ 
text of the bidding decision. The applicability of these 
models rests largely on the acceptance by the decision maker 
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of the objective of maximization of expected value as a 
criterion in bid selection. 
While models one and *two provide a means for a contractor 
to utilize quantitative tools in the decision making process 
in a manner which is consistent with existing analytical re¬ 
sources, model three would require computer facilities for 
the required multiple regression problem. Although model 
three is intuitively appealing in that it incorporates fac¬ 
tors into the decision model which do or should influence the 
bidding decision, its applicability is suspect within the 
framework of the decision process of most small contractors. 
When necessary parameters can be estimated by an outside 
agent with the required facilities, the contractor could 
proceed in applying model two in estimating optimal bids. 
Although the results of this research cast doubt on the ap¬ 
propriateness of the selected independent variables in pre¬ 
dicting bid to cost ratios, selection of alternative indepen¬ 
dent variables could have contrasting results. The variables 
used were chosen from available data. Many factors with in¬ 
tuitively high potential correlation with the dependent 
variable were not recorded for historical bids. 
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APPENDIX I 
q u (q) v (q) 
-1.60 8.52299 -15.64140 — 
-1.61 8.66576 -15.94298 — 
-1.62 8.2123 -16.29138 — 
-1.63 8.97257 -16.62605 — 
-1.64 9.12981 -16.96762 — 
-1.65 9.29130 -17.32201 — 
-1.66 9.45826 -17.70108 — 
-1.67 9.63094 -18.08728 — 
-1.68 9.79959 -18.45686 — 
-1.69 9.97388 -18.85242 — 
-1.70 10.16383 -19.28932 — 
-1.71 10.33946 -19.67209 — 
-1.72 10.53136 -20.10837 — 
-1.73 10.73013 -20.57646 — 
-1.74 10.92369 -21.01971 — 
-1.75 . 11.12283 -21.46173 — 
-1.76 11.33020 -21.93474 — 
-1.77 11.54382 -22.42686 — 
-1.78 11.76651 -22.95818 — 
-1.79 11.98135 -23.44421 — 
-1.80 12.20380 -23.95137 — 
-1.81 12.45033 -24.53911 — 
-1.82 12.68857 -25.10953 — 
-1.83 12.91979 -25.62871 — 
-1.84 13.17576 -26.25128 — 
-1.85 13.42303 -26.81677 — 
-1.86 13.70014 -27.50125 — 
-1.87 13.96687 -28.12247 — 
-1.88 14.24230 -28.79057 — 
-1.89 14.50823 -29.41170 — 
-1.90 14.80641 -30.14572 — 
-1.91 15.09163 -30.82407 — 
-1.92 15.38924 -3.153664 — 
-1.93 15.69677 -32.27957 — 
-1.94 16.01643 -33.05818 — 
-1.95 16.34898 -33.87503 — 
-1.96 16.69521 -34.73288 — 
-1.97 17.02617 -35.54718 — 
-1.98 17.36832 -36.36578 — 
-1.99 17.72595 -37.25885 — 
q u (q) v (q) 
.00 18.09628 -38.19257 
.01 18.48393 -39.17747 
.02 18.84970 -40.06259 
.03 19.26772 -41.14226 
.04 19.66466 -42.11905 
.05 20.07787 -43.14316 
.06 20.50836 -44.26093 
.07 20.95726 -45.39227 
.08 21.37691 -46.43040 
.09 21.86414 -47.72476 
.10 22.32045 -48.87292 
.11 22.79814 -50.08237 
.12 23.29384 -51.34761 
.13 23.81113 -52.67790 
.14 24.35149 -54.13869 
.15 24.85353 -55.34721 
.16 25.44185 -56.95966 
.17 25.98944 -58.36758 
.18 26.56064 -59.84636 
.19 27.15427 -61.39529 
.20 27.77747 -63.03214 
.21 28.42651 -64.83321 
.22 29.10915 -66.74419 
.23 29.73192 -68.26988 
.24 30.38461 -69.96799 
.25 31.16087 -72.18568 
.26 31.87419 -74.07672 
.27 32.62045 -76.17656 
.28 33.28955 -77.77013 
.29 34.10344 -80.08507 
.30 34.95760 -82.53830 
.31 35.72563 -84.41396 
.32 36.65926 -87.26674 
.33 37.50378 -89.50883 
.34 38.38759 -91.86865 
.35 39.30952 -94.50220 
.36 40.28049 -97.13400 
.37- 41.12448 -99.26540 
.38 42.18297 -102.34166 











































q u (q) v (q) q u(q) v (q) 
-0.80 2.72040 -4.17670 -1.20 4.55664 -7.46703 
-0.81 2.75226 -4.22939 -1.21 4.62168 -7.59225 
-0.82 2.78561 -4.28420 -1.22 4.69024 -7.72234 
-0.83 2.81818 -4.33868 -1.23 4.75801 -7.85347 
-0.84 2.85230 -4.39642 -1.24 4.82693 -7.98602 
-0.85 2.88597 -4.45308 -1.25 4.89814 -8.12401 
-0.86 2.92126 -4.51212 -1.26 4.96785 -8.25938 
-0.87 2.95717 -4.57292 -1.27 5.04211 -8.40385 
-0.88 2.99225 -4.63327 -1.28 5.11775 -8.55292 
-0.89 3.02905 -4.69512 -1.29 5.19297 -8.70061 
-0.90 3.06614 -4.75964 -1.30 5.26955 -8.84980 
-0.91 3.10429 -4.82529 -1.31 5.35127 -9.0.267 
-0.92 3.14275 -4.89138 -1.32 5.43200 -9.17323 
-0.93 3.81192 -4.95947 -1.33 5.51427 -9.33562 
-0.94 3.22183 -5.02840 -1.34 5.59594 -9.49567 
-0.95 3.26210 -5.09906 -1.35 5.68267 -9.67019 
-0.96 3.30485 -5.17350 -1.36 5.77181 -9.85141 
-0.97 3.34671 -5.24599 -1.37 5.85971 -10.02566 
-0.98 3.38938 -5.32209 -1.38 5.95322 -10.22000 
-0.99 3.43249 -5.39878 -1.39 6.04545 -10.40310 
-1.00 3.47645 -5.47645 -1.40 6.14028 -10.59721 
-1.01 3.52170 -5.55698 -1.41 6.23780 -10.79885 
-1.02 3.56854 -5.64078 -1.42 6.33779 -10.99172 
-1.03 3.61525 -5.72462 -1.43 6.43624 -11.20360 
-1.04 3.66251 -5.80913 -1.44 6.53781 -11.41167 
-1.05 3.71074 -5.89636 -1.45 6.64634 -11.64054 
-1.06 3.76000 -5.98477 -1.46 6.75328 -11.85959 
-1.07 3.81031 -6.07606 -1.47 6.86263 -12.09120 
-1.08 3.86125 -6.16987 -1.48 6.97601 -12.32806 
-1.09 3.91330 -6.26502 -1.49 7.08669 -12.55729 
-1.10 3.96650 -6.36151 -1.50 7.20618 -12.81205 
-1.11 4.02088 -6.46308 -1.51 7.32367 -13.06012 
-1.12 4.07602 -6.56377 -1.52 7.44391 -13.31096 
-1.13 4.13289 -6.67034 -1.53 7.56866 -13.57920 
-1.14 4.19059 -6.77804 -1.54 7.69648 -13.85093 
-1.15 4.24915 -6.88683 -1.55 7.82834 -14.13392 
-1.16 4.30747 -6.99505 -1.56 7.95770 -14.40782 
-1.17 4.36879 -7.11139 -1.57 8.09802 -14.71452 
-1.18 4.42936 -7.22660 -1.58 8.23493 -15.01048 
-1.19 4.49364 -7.34892 -1.59 8.37711 -15.32013 
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q u (q) v (q) q u (q) v (q) 
0.0 1.25345 -2.00000 -0.40 1.77953 -2.71171 
-0.01 1.26347 -2.01267 -0.41 1.79689 -2.73678 
-0.02 1.27350 -2.02554 -0.42 1.81440 -2.76192 
-0.03 1.28385 -2.03863 -0.43 1.83228 -2.78792 
-0.04 1.29453 -2.05164 -0.44 1.85032 -2.81402 
-0.05 1.30497 -2.06518 -0.45 1.86852 -2.84070 
-0.06 1.31567 -2.07897 -0.46 1.88688 -2.86799 
-0.07 1.32638 -2.09298 -0.47 1.90593 -2.89587 
-0.08 1.33744 -2.10694 -0.48 1.92518 -2.92441 
-0.09 1.34886 -2.12154 -0.49 1.94432 -2.95292 
-0.10 1.35970 -2.13597 -0.50 1.96303 -2.98169 
-0.11 1.37150 -2.15081 -0.51 1.98401 -3.01211 
-0.12 1.38298 -2.16585 -0.52 2.00430 -3.04212 
-0.13 1.39459 -2.18120 -0.53 2.02452 -3.07270 
-0.14 1.40648 -2.19686 -0.54 2.04582 -3.10479 
-0.15 1.41850 -2.21286 -0.55 2.06707 -3.13692 
-0.16 1.43082 -2.22884 -0.56 2.08886 -3.17613 
-0.17 1.44329 -2.24529 -0.57 2.11059 -3.20312 
-0.18 1.45580 -2.26223 -0.58 2.13227 -3.23687 
-0.19 1.46835 -2.27883 -0.59 2.15513 -3.27173 
-0.20 1.48159 -2.29632 -0.60 2.17797 -3.30665 
-0.21 1.49462 -2.31409 -0.61 2.20139 -3.34263 
-0.22 1.50770 -2.33182 -0.62 2.13366 -3.32284 
-0.23 1.52124 -2.35006 -0.63 2.24916 -3.41716 
-0.24 1.53457 -2.36820 -0.64 2.27284 -3.45417 
-0.25 1.54823 -2.38716 -0.65 2.29783 -3.49324 
-0.26 1.56235 -2.40628 -0.66 2.32284 -3.53312 
-0.27 1.57629 -2.42573 -0.67 2.34892 -3.57430 
-0.28 1.59098 -2.44544 -0.68 2.37429 -3.61461 
-0.29 1.60549 -2.46549 -0.69 2.40108 -3.65723 
-0.30 1.62008 -2.48594 -0.70 2.42715 -3.69893 
-0.31 1.63519 -2.50707 -0.71 2.45437 -3.74204 
-0.32 1.65040 -2.52821 -0.72 2.48197 -3.78712 
-0.33 1.66570 -2.54979 -0.73 2.51080 -3.83298 
-0.34 1.68154 -2.57168 -0.74 2.53922 -3.87889 
-0.35 1.69723 -2.59394 -0.75 2.56858 -3.92798 
-0.36 1.71329 -2.61677 -0.76 2.59752 -3.97356 
-0.37 1.72929 -2.63952 -0.77 2.62778 -4.02355 
-0.38 1.74569 -2.66310 -0.78 2.65817 -4.07379 
-0.39 1.76278 -2.68756 -0.79 2.68904 -4.12453 
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q u (q) v (q) 
0.0 1.25345 -2.00000 
0.01 1.24342 -1.98753 
0.02 1.23339 -1.97526 
0.03 1.22367 -1.96318 
0.04 1.21425 -1.95156 
0.05 1.20507 -1.93981 
0.06 1.19563 -1.92824 
0.07 1.18618 -1.91685 
0.08 1.17702 -1.90589 
0.09 1.16813 -1.89474 
0.10 1.15919 -1.88408 
0.11 1.15057 -1.87348 
0.12 1.14163 -1.86310 
0.13 1.13321 -1.85276 
0.14 1.12453 -1.84261 
0.15 1.11635 -1.83248 
0.16 1.10789 -1.82280 
0.17 1.09995 -1.81313 
0.18 1.09197 -1.80330 
0.19 1.08397 -1.79416 
0.20 1.07596 -1.78481 
0.21 1.06817 -1.77553 
0.22 1.06035 -1.76664 
0.23 1.05277 -1.75774 
0.24 1.04541 -1.74917 
0.25 1.03776 -1.74049 
0.26 1.03033 -1.73206 
0.27 1.02313 -1.72367 
0.28 1.01590 -1.71557 
0.29 1.00889 -1.70749 
0.30 1.00183 -1.69950 
0.31 0.99500 -1.69145 
0.32 0.98813 -1.68375 
0.33 0.98121 -1.67613 
0.34 0.97450 -1.66869 
0.35 0.96802 -1.66125 
0.36 0.96122 -1.65397 
0.37 0.95464 -1.64694 
0.38 0.94828 -1.63980 
0.39 0.94212 -1.63253 
q u (q) v (q) 
0.40 0.93565 -1.62579 
0.41 0.92939 -1.61892 
0.42 0.92308 -1.61237 
0.43 0.01724 -1.60556 
0.44 0.91135 -1.59907 
0.45 0.90541 -1.59263 
0.46 0.89941 -1.58625 
0.47 0.89362 -1.57996 
0.48 0.88776 -1.57372 
0.49 0.88214 -1.56766 
0.50 0.87617 -1.56204 
0.51 0.87068 -1.55583 
0.52 0.86514 -1.55018 
0.53 0.85982 -1.54442 
0.54 0.85441 -1.53860 
0.55 0.84923 -1.53291 
0.56 , 0.84370 -1.52496 
0.57 0.83840 -1.52208 
0.58 0.83333 -1.51661 
0.59 0.82816 -1.51130 
0.60 0.82323 -1.50611 
0.61 0.81793 -1.50114 
0.62 0.90401 -1.43952 
0.63 0.80801 -1.49089 
0.64 0.80314 -1.48615 
0.65 0.79814 -1.48133 
0.66 0.79339 -1.47635 
0.67 0.78883 -1.47131 
0.68 0.78427 -1.46667 
0.69 0.77958 -1.46193 
0.70 0.77490 -1.45760 
0.71 0.77040 -1.45319 
0.72 0.76583 -1.44857 
0.73 0.76145 -1.44411 
0.74 0.75676 -1.44004 
0.75 0.75257 -1.43538 
0.76 0.74808 -1.43162 
0.77 0.74376 -1.42726 
0.78 0.73972 -1.42290 
0.79 0.73562 -1.41881 
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q u (q) v (q) q u(q) v (q) 
0.80 0.73145 -1.41474 1.20 0.59269 -1.28890 
0.81 0.72721 -1.41094 1.21 0.58936 -1.28686 
0.82 0.72316 -1.40701 1.22 0.58681 -1.28406 
0.83 0.71914 -1.40322 1.23 0.58387 -1.28171 
0.84 0.71530 -1.39902 1.24 0.58140 -1.27899 
0.85 0.71115 -1.39552 1.25 0.57831 -1.27695 
0.86 0.70718 -1.39186 1.26 0.57539 -1.27502 
0.87 0.70315 -1.38822 1.27 0.57271 -1.27261 
0.88 0.69915 -1.38473 1.28 0.57053 -1.26947 
0.89 0.69534 -1.38131 1.29 0.56740 -1.26788 
0.90 0.69185 -1.37731 1.30 0.56476 -1.26588 
0.91 0.68790 -1.37392 1.31 0.56239 -1.26301 
0.92 0.68427 -1.37046 1.32 0.55962 -1.26100 
0.93 0.68057 -1.36701 1.33 0.55738 -1.25852 
0.94 • 0.67680 -1.36383 1.34 0.55412 -1.25776 
0.95 0.67336 -1.36030 1.35 0.55175 -1.25528 
0.96 0.66971 -1.35690 1.36 0.54930 -1.25278 
0.97 0.66613 -1.35392 1.37 0.54644 -1.25157 
0.98 0.66248 -1.35067 1.38 0.54451 -1.24816 
0.99 0.65917 -1.34731 1.39 0.54216 -1.24640 
1.00 0.65579 -1.34421 1.40 0.53975 -1.24428 
1.01 0.65192 -1.34155 1.41 0.53726 -1.24215 
1.02 0.64909 -1.33777 1.42 0.53434 -1.24143 
1.03 0.64550 -1.33497 1.43 0.53240 -1.23868 
1.04 0.64227 -1.33201 1.44 0.52933 -1.23799 
1.05 0.63897 -1.32906 1.45 0.52726 -1.23521 
1.06 0.63560 -1.32640 1.46 0.52475 -1.23389 
1.07 0.63216 -1.32374 1.47 0.52289 -1.23110 
1.08 0.62910 -1.32062 1.48 0.52024 -1.22978 
1.09 0.62596 -1.31777 1.49 0.51787 -1.22851 
1.10 0.62276 -1.31522 1.50 0.51583 -1.22606 
1.11 0.61949 -1.31238 1.51 0.51332 -1.22479 
1.12 0.61661 -1.30960 1.52 0.51153 -1.22273 
1.13 0.61319 -1.30706 1.53 0.50889 -1.22146 
1.14 0.61018 -1.30429 1.54 0.50697 -1.21937 
1.15 0.60758 -1.30124 1.55 0.50500 -1.21725 
1.16 0.60413 -1.29944 1.56 0.50254 -1.21643 
1.17 0.60139 -1.29638 1.57 0.50043 -1.21429 
1.18 0.59829 -1.29402 1.58 0.59869 -1.21211 
1.19 0.59542 -1.29125 1.59 0.49601 -1.21132 
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q u (q) v (q) 
1.60 0.41414 -1.20911 
1.61 0.49176 -1.20877 
1.62 0.48976 -1.20654 
1.63 0.48817 -1.20423 
1.64 0.48558 -1.20393 
1.65 0.48387 -1.20206 
1.66 0.48211 -1.19968 
1.67 0.48028 -1.19775 
1.68 0.47790 -1.19744 
1.69 0.47544 -1.19666 
1.70 0.47447 -1.19290 
1.71 0.47135 -1.19437 
1.72 0.46975 -1.19228 
1.73 0.46809 -1.18963 
1.74 0.46583 -1.18930 
1.75 0.46466 -1.18698 
1.76 0.46226 -1.18668 
1.77 0.46098 -1.18428 
1.78 0.45844 -1.18345 
1.79 0.45647 -1.18301 
1.80 0.45443 -1.18260 
1.81 0.45290 . -1.18010 
1.82 0.45204 -1.17671 
1.83 0.44920 -1.17847 
1.84 0.44823 -1.17499 
1.85 0.44660 -1.17431 
1.86 0.44413 -1.17330 
1.87 0.44236 -1.17264 
1.88 0.44200 -1.16858 
1.89 0.43946 -1.16968 
1.90 0.43750 -1.16835 
1.91 0.43634 -1.16663 
1.92 0.43354 -1.16790 
1.93 0.43226 -1.16616 
1.94 0.43092 -1.16438 
1.95 0.42953 -1.16256 
1.96 0.42808 • -1.16070 
1.97 0.42583 -1.16098 
1.98 0.42527 -1.15855 
1.99 0.42287 -1.15887 
q u(q) v (q) 
2.00 0.42222 -1.15556 
2.01 0.41966 -1.15592 
2.02 0.41811 -1.15572 
2.03 0.41732 -1.15221 
2.04 0.41566 -1.15198 
2.05 0.41393 -1.15177 
2.06 0.41213 -1.15073 
2.07 0.41026 -1.15056 
2.08 0.40959 -1.14870 
2.09 0.40757 -1.14764 
2.10 0.40682 -1.14568 
2.11 0.40371 -1.14855 
2.12 0.40284 -1.14658 
2.13 0.40194 -1.14455 
2.14 0.40099 -1.14144 
2.15 0.39899 -1.14358 
2.16' 0.39793 -1.14038 
2.17 0.39578 -1.14161 
2.18 0.39353 -1.14293 
2.19 0.39394 -1.13833 
2.20 0.39155 -1.13969 
2.21 0.39193 -1.13369 
2.22 0.38938 -1.13394 
2.23 0.38855 -1.13395 
2.24 0.38462 -1.13964 
2.25 0.38486 -1.13316 
2.26 0.38387 -1.13196 
2.27 0.38284 -1.12945 
2.28 0.38407 -1.13401 
2.29 0.37931 -1.13151 
2.30 0.37809 -1.12892 
2.31 0.37545 -1.13389 
2.32 0.37778 -1.12132 
2.33 0.37500 -1.12500 
2.34 0.37209 -1.12890 
2.35 0.37302 -1.12223 
2.36 0.36992 -1.12633 
2.37 0.36929 -1.12656 
2.38 0.37021 -1.11937 












































Std Dev H(y) H'(y) 
0.01000 1009.61743 9715.60156 
0.02000 259.27197 2404.33130 
0.03000 119.79405 1040.24365 
0.04000 70.55414 568.27954 
0.05000 47.45457 353.76440 
0.06000 34.68512 239.58818 
0.07000 26.82515 172.14040 
0.08000 21.60580 129.22214 
0.09000 17.93889 100.33736 
0.10000 15.24826 80.02769 
0.11000 13.20477 65.23619 
0.12000 11.60879 54.14795 
0.13000 10.33323 45.63263 
0.14000 9.29383 38.95799 
0.15000 8.84281 33.63333 
0.16000 7.70941 29.32025 
0.17000 7.09412 25.77957 
0.18000 6.56514 22.83844 
0.19000 6.10605 20.36966 
0.20000 5.70423 18.27774 
0.21000 5.34990 16.49022 
0.22000 5.03533 14.95103 
0.23000 4.75434 13.61640 
0.24000 4.50197 12.45188 
0.25000 4.27416 11.42982 
0.26000 4.06756 10.52801 
0.27000 3.87942 9.72836 
0.28000 3.70741 9.01606 
0.29000 3.54958 8.37891 
0.30000 3.40430 7.80671 
0.31000 3.27014 7.29098 
0.32000 3.14590 6,82451 
0.33000 3.03053 6.40127 
0.34000 2.92314 6.01610 
0.35000 2.82294 5.66455 
0.36000 2.72924 5,34286 
0.37000 2.64144 5.04773 
0.38000 2.55900 4.77633 
0.39000 2.48146 4.52619 
0.40000 2.40840 4.29515 
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Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.04000 0.01000 615.71997 9682.41016 
1.04000 0.02000 164.12070 2317.73047 
1.04000 0.03000 79.09081 982.68262 
1.04000 0.04000 48.45695 530.95801 
1.04000 0.05000 33.74411 328.81396 
1.04000 0.06000 25.41370 222.29855 
1.04000 0.07000 20.16663 159.75687 
1.04000 0.08000 16.60632 120.08727 
1.04000 0.09000 14.05467 93.42596 
1.04000 0.10000 12.14779 74.68266 
1.04000 0.11000 10.67506 61.02313 
1.04000 0.12000 9.50705 50.77159 
1.04000 0.13000 8.57028 42.88724 
1.04000 0.14000 7.77876 36.69679 
1.04000. 0.15000 7.12359 31.74950 
1.04000 0.16000 6.56705 27.73480 
1.04000 0.17000 6.08885 24.43303 
1.04000 0.18000 5.67383 21.68536 
1.04000 0.19000 5.31046 19.37482 
1.04000 0.20000 4.98982 17.41362 
1.04000 0.21000 4.70490 15.73490 
1.04000 0.22000 4.45014 14.28708 
1.04000 0.23000 4.22105 13.02973 
1.04000 0.24000 4.01399 11.93094 
1.04000 0.25000 3.82598 10.96519 
1.04000 0.26000 3.65452 10.11187 
1.04000 0.27000 3.49755 9.35422 
1.04000 0.28000 3.35332 8.67847 
1.04000 0.29000 3.22037 8.07325 
1.04000 0.30000 3.09743 7.52911 
1.04000 0.31000 2.98341 7.03808 
1.04000 0.32000 2.87741 6.59350 
1.04000 0.33000 2.77859 6.18970 
1.04000 0.34000 2.68627 5.82182 
1.04000 0.35000 2.59983 5.48576 
1.04000 0.36000 2.51873 5.17794 
1.04000 0.37000 2.44249 4.89529 
1.04000 0.38000 2.37069 4.63514 
1.04000 0.39000 2.30296 4.39516 
1.04000 0.40000 2.23896 4.17335 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.05000 0.01000 518.55054 9618.49609 
1.05000 0.02000 141.10922 2273.09546 
1.05000 0.03000 69.37074 958.35620 
1.05000 0.04000 43.21187 516.89038 
1.05000 0.05000 30.49664 320.10986 
1.05000 0.06000 23.21768 216.59204 
1.05000 0.07000 18.58772 155.83224 
1.05000 0.08000 15.41887 117.28104 
1.05000 0.09000 13.13034 91.35397 
1.05000 0.10000 11.40051 73.11128 
1.05000 0.11000 10.07069 59.80421 
1.05000 0.12000 9.00397 49.80763 
1.05000 0.13000 8.13515 42.11209 
1.05000 0.14000 7.41484 36.06439 
1.05000 0.15000 6.80862 31.22696 
1.05000 0.16000 6.29181 27.29817 
1.05000 0.17000 5.84630 24.06447 
1.05000 0.18000 5.45849 21.37151 
1.05000 0.19000 5.11801 19.10536 
1.05000 0.20000 4.81680 17.18056 
1.05000 0.21000 4.54853 15.53202 
1.05000 0.22000 4.30812 14.10938 
1.05000 0.23000 4.09151 12.87320 
1.05000 0.24000 3.89535 11.79237 
1.05000 0.25000 3.71692 10.84193 
1.05000 0.26000 3.55393 10.00175 
1.05000 0.27000 3.40448 9.25544 
1.05000 0.28000 3.26696 8.58952 
1.05000 0.29000 3.14002 7.99288 
1.05000 0.30000 3.02248 7.45623 
1.05000 0.31000 2.91335 6.97181 
1.05000 0.32000 2.81176 6.53306 
1.05000 0.33000 2.71696 6.13442 
1.05000 0.34000 2.62830 5.77114 
1.05000 0.35000 2.54520 5.43917 
1.05000 0.36000 2.46716 5.13503 
1.05000 0.37000 2.39373 4.85567 
1.05000 0.38000 2.32452 4.59848 
1.05000 0.39000 2.25917 4.36118 
1.05000 0.40000 2.19738 4.14179 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H(y) H' (y) 
1.06000 0.01000 422.47583 9495.71875 
1.06000 0.02000 118.63675 2211.01929 
1.06000 0.03000 59.92586 927.73999 
1.06000 0.04000 38.12073 500.17334 
1.06000 0.05000 27.34254 310.13452 
1.06000 0.06000 21.08206 210.20854 
1.06000 0.07000 17.04997 151.51816 
1.06000 0.08000 14.26061 114.23622 
1.06000 0.09000 12.22745 89.12814 
1.06000 0.10000 10.68542 71.43655 
1.06000 0.11000 9.47883 58.51334 
1.06000 0.12000 8.51077 48.79218 
1.06000 0.13000 7.71792 41.29912 
1.C6000 0.14000 7.05736 35.40361 
1.06000 0.15000 6.49896 30.68274 
1.06000 0.16000 6.02100 26.84468 
1.06000 0.17000 5.60748 23.68265 
1.06000 0.13000 5.24633 21.04703 
1.06000 0.19000 4.92829 18.82730 
1.06000 0.20000 4.64614 16.94049 
1.06000 0.21000 4.39420 15.32334 
1.06000 0.22000 4.16790 13.92684 
1.06000 0.23000 3.96354 12.71264 
1.06000 0.24000 3.77810 11.65037 
1.06000 0.25000 3.60910 10.71575 
1.06000 0.26000 3.45444 9.88914 
1.06000 0.27000 3.31240 9.15452 
1.06000 0.28000 3.18150 8.49871 
1.06000 0.29000 3.06048 7.91089 
1.06000 0.30000 2.94827 7.38196 
1.06000 0.31000 2.84395 6.90431 
1.06000 0.32000 2.74672 6.47153 
1.06000 0.33000 2.65588 6.07817 
1.06000 0.34000 2.57083 5.71960 
1.06000 0.35000 2.49103 5.39183 
1.06000 0.36000 2.41601 5.09143 
1.06000 0.37000 2.34536 4.81543 
1.06000 0.38000 2.27870 4.56128 
1.06000 0.39000 2.21572 4.32671 
1.06000 0.40000 2.15611 4.10979 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.07000 0.01000 328.24170 9271.00000 
1.07000 0.02000 96.91385 2123.82349 
1.07000 0.03000 50.82744 889.19653 
1.07000 0.04000 33.21266 480.34912 
1.07000 0.05000 24.29556 298.73047 
1.07000 0.06000 19.01408 203.08620 
1.07000 0.07000 15.55752 146.78702 
1.07000 0.08000 13.13411 110.93925 
1.07000 0.09000 11.34767 86.74149 
1.07000 0.10000 9.97964 69.65460 
1.07000 0.11000 8.90028 57.14835 
1.07000 0.12000 8.02800 47.72386 
1.07000 0.13000 7.30904 40.44749 
1.07000 0.14000 6.70665 34.71394 
1.07000 0.15000 6.19485 30.11646 
1.07000 0.16000 5.75482 26.37408 
1.07000 0.17000 5.37255 23.28735 
1.07000 0.18000 5.03747 20.71179 
1.07000 0.19000 4.74139 18.54057 
1.07000 0.20000 4.47792 16.69337 
1.07000 0.21000 4.24200 15.10884 
1.07000 0.22000 4.02953 13.73946 
1.07000 0.23000 3.83720 12.54801 
1.07000 0.24000 3.66229 11.50495 
1.07000 0.25000 3.50255 10.58668 
1.07000 0.26000 3.35610 9.77403 
1.07000 0.27000 3.22135 9.05143 
1.07000 0.28000 3.09695 8.40606 
1.07000 0.29000 2.98176 7.82728 
1.07000 0.30000 2.87481 7.30626 
1.07000 0.31000 2.77523 6.83557 
1.07000 0.32000 2.68230 6.40891 
1.07000 0.33000 2.59537 6.02097 
1.07000 0.34000 2.51388 5.66720 
1.07000 0.35000 2.43734 5.34372 
1.07000 0.36000 2.36531 5.04715 
1.07000 0.37000 2.29740 4.77459 
1.07000 0.38000 2.23327 4.52352 
1.07000 0.39000 2.17262 4.29173 
1.07000 0.40000 2.11516 4.07733 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.08000 1.01000 237.26978 8844.17969 
1.08000 1.02000 76.24045 2000.68188 
1.08000 1.03000 42.16373 840.83301 
1.08000 1.04000 28.52100 456.94385 
1.08000 1.05000 21.37068 285.74512 
1.08000 1.06000 17.02142 195.16803 
1.08000 1.07000 14.11466 141.61417 
1.08000 1.08000 12.04196 107.37849 
1.08000 1.09000 10.49262 84.18793 
1.08000 1.10000 9.29226 67.76205 
1.08000 1.11000 8.33577 55.70735 
1.08000 1.12000 7.55619 46.60152 
1.08000 1.13000 6.90887 39.55653 
1.08000 1.14000 6.36298 33.99489 
1.08000 1.15000 5.89653 29.52786 
1.08000 1.16000 5.49343 25.88615 
1.08000 1.17000 5.14165 22.87843 
1.08000 1.18000 4.83202 20.36574 
1.08000 1.19000 4.55740 18.24512 
1.08000 1.20000 4.31221 16.43910 
1.08000 1.21000 4.09196 14.88646 
1.08000 1.22000 3.89305 13.54721 
1.08000 1.23000 3.71253 12.37929 
1.08000 1.24000 3.54795 11.35608 
1.08000 1.25000 3.39732 10.45466 
1.08000 1.26000 3.25892 9.65643 
1.08000 1.27000 3.13134 8.94621 
1.08000 1.28000 3.01334 8.31152 
1.08000 1.29000 2.90390 7.74206 
1.08000 1.30000 2.80211 7.22916 
1.08000 1.31000 2.70721 6.76558 
1.08000 1.32000 2.61851 6.34519 
1.08000 1.33000 2.53544 5.96280 
1.08000 1.34000 2.45746 5.61395 
1.08000 1.35000 2.38413 5.29484 
1.08000 1.36000 2.31505 5.00218 
1.08000 1.37000 2.24985 4.73313 
1.08000 1.38000 2.18821 4.48521 
1.08000 1.39000 2.12986 4.25627 
1.08000 1.40000 2.07455 4.04443 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
0.09000 0.01000 152.48480 8002.78906 
0.09000 0.02000 57.04277 1827.77637 
0.09000 0.03000 34,04326 780.67676 
0.09000 0.04000 24.08411 429.51563 
0.09000 0.05000 18.58464 271.04883 
0.09000 0.06000 15.11246 186.40645 
0.09000 0.07000 12.72604 135.97987 
0.09000 0.08000 10.98692 103.54486 
0.09000 0.09000 9.66408 81.46307 
0.09000 0.10000 8.62446 65.75665 
0.09000 0.11000 7.78614 54.18900 
0.09000 0.12000 7.09594 45.42448 
0.09000 0.13000 6.51786 38.62575 
0.09000 0.14000 6.02670 33.24622 
0.09000 0.15000 5.60424 28.91672 
0.09000 0.16000 5.23705 23.38087 
0.09000 0.17000 4.91493 22.45587 
0.09000 0.18000 4.63010 20.00879 
0.09000 0.19000 4.37644 17.94089 
0.09000 0.20000 4.14910 16.17769 
0.09000 0.21000 3.94419 14.66221 
0.09000 0.22000 3.75854 13.35007 
0.09000 0.23000 3.58958 12.20648 
0.09000 0.24000 3.43514 11.20377 
0.09000 0.25000 3.29343 10.31972 
0.09000 0.26000 3.16294 9.53630 
0.09000 0.27000 3.04239 8.83882 
0.09000 0.28000 2.93069 8.21514 
0.09000 0.29000 2.82690 7.65522 
0.09000 0.30000 2.73020 7.15065 
0.09000 0.31000 2.63990 6.69436 
0.09000 0.32000 2.55538 6.28039 
0.09000 0.33000 2.47609 5.90366 
0.09000 0.34000 2.40158 5.55984 
0.09000 0.35000 2.33142 5.24521 
0.09000 0.36000 2.26524 4.95654 
0.09000 0.37000 2.20272 4.69107 
0.09000 0.38000 2.14355 4.44635 
0.09000 0.39000 2.08748 4.22031 
0.09000 0.40000 2.03426 4.01108 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H(y) H' (y) 
1.10000 0.01000 79.77246 6363.64453 
1.10000 0.02000 39.88620 1590.90620 
1.10000 0.03000 26.59082 707.07202 
1.10000 0.04000 19.94312 397.72778 
1.10000 0.05000 15.95449 254.54572 
1.10000 0.06000 13.29541 176.76782 
1.10000 0.07000 11.39607 129.87030 
1.10000 0.08000 9.97156 99.43195 
1.10000 0.09000 8.86361 78.56348 
1.10000 0.10000 7.97725 63.63646 
1.10000 0.11000 7.25204 52.59212 
1.10000 0.12000 6.64771 44.19197 
1.10000 0.13000 6.13634 37.65468 
1.10000 0.14000 5.69803 32.46756 
1.10000 0.15000 5.31816 28.28285 
1.10000 0.16000 4.98578 24.85799 
1.10000 0.17000 4.69250 22.01952 
1.10000 0.18000 4.43180 19.64087 
1.10000 0.19000 4.19855 17.62781 
1.10000 0.20000 3.98862 15.90909 
1.10000 0.21000 3.79869 14.43002 
1.10000 0.22000 3.62602 13.14802 
1.10000 0.23000 3.46837 12.02956 
1.10000 0.24000 3,32385 11.04798 
1.10000 0.25000 3.19090 10.18182 
1.10000 0.26000 3.06817 9.41367 
1.10000 0.27000 2.95453 8.72927 
1.10000 0.28000 2.84901 8.11688 
1.10000 0.29000 2.75077 7.56675 
1.10000 0.30000 2.65908 7.07071 
1.10000 0.31000 2.57330 6.62189 
1.10000 0.32000 2.49289 6.21449 
1.10000 0.33000 2.41735 5.84356 
1.10000 0.34000 2.34625 5.50487 
1.10000 0.35000 2.27921 5.19480 
1.10000 0.36000 2.21590 4.91021 
1.10000 0.37000 2.15601 4.64838 
1.10000 0.38000 2.09927 4.40695 
1.10000 0.39000 2.04545 4.18385 
1.10000 0.40000 1.99431 3.97728 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.11000 0.01000 28.75339 3702.16187 
1.11000 0.02000 25.45258 1284.16284 
1.11000 0.03000 19.94554 619.44678 
1.11000 0.04000 16.14267 361.47974 
1.11000 0.05000 13.49870 236.21107 
1.11000 0.06000 11.57927 166.24478 
1.11000 0.07000 10.12965 123.28296 
1.11000 0.08000 8.99877 95.03877 
1.11000 0.09000 8.09304 75.48891 
1.11000 0.10000 7.35184 61.40146 
1.11000 0.11000 6.73433 50.91682 
1.11000 0.12000 6.21209 42.90405 
1.11000 0.13000 5.76474 36.64336 
1.11000 0.14000 5.37731 31.65903 
1.11000 0.15000 5.03854 27.62625 
l.iiooo 0.16000 4.73983 24.31757 
1.11000 0.17000 4.47449 21.56937 
1.11000 0.18000 4.23724 19.26198 
1.11000 0.19000 4.02384 17.30592 
1.11000 0.20000 3.83087 15.63330 
1.11000 0.21000 3.65554 14.19194 
1.11000 0.22000 3.49554 12.94106 
1.11000 0.23000 3.34894 11.84852 
1.11000 0.24000 3.21414 10.88872 
1.11000 0.25000 3.08976 10.04098 
1.11000 0.26000 2.97464 9.28851 
1.11000 0.27000 2.86776 8.61755 
1.11000 0.28000 2.76833 8.01674 
1.11000 0.29000 2.67554 7.47665 
1.11000 0.30000 2.58876 6.98934 
1.11000 0.31000 2.50744 6.54817 
1.11000 0.32000 2.43106 6.14748 
1.11000 0.33000 2.35920 5.78247 
1.11000 0.34000 2.29146 5.44903 
1.11000 0.35000 2.22751 5.14363 
1.11000 0.36000 2.16702 4.86319 
1.11000 0.37000 2.10973 4.60509 
1.11000 0.38000 2.05539 4.36698 
1.11000 0.39000 2.00378 4.14689 
1.11000 0.40000 1.95470 3.94303 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.12000 0.01000 5.52316 1135.16235 
1.12000 0.02000 14.37668 925.53906 
1.12000 0.03000 14.24194 519.32739 
1.12000 0.04000 12.72631 321.04150 
1.12000 0.05000 11.23530 216.11641 
1.12000 0.06000 9.97277 154.86159 
1.12000 0.07000 3.93150 116.22762 
1.12000 0.08000 8.07134 90.36998 
1.12000 0.09000 7.35411 72.24165 
1.12000 0.10000 6.74935 59.05278 
1.12000 0.11000 6.23376 49.16374 
1.12000 0.12000 5.78963 41.56122 
1.12000 0.13000 5.40346 35.59210 
1.12000 0.14000 5.06482 30.82072 
1.12000 0.15000 4.76560 26.94710 
1.12000 0.16000 4.49939 23.75969 
1.12000 0.17000 4.26106 21.10556 
1.12000 0.18000 4.04652 18.87221 
1.12000 0.19000 3.85239 16.97520 
1.12000 0.20000 3.67591 15.35035 
1.12000 0.21000 3.51481 13.94793 
1.12000 0.22000 3.36716 12.72920 
1.12000 0.23000 3.23136 11.66340 
1.12000 0.24000 3.10604 10.72600 
1.12000 0.25000 2.99004 9.89720 
1.12000 0.26000 2.88237 9.16083 
1.12000 0.27000 2.78215 8.50367 
1.12000 0.28000 2.68865 7.91475 
1.12000 0.29000 2.60121 7.38492 
1.12000 0.30000 2.51927 6.90656 
1.12000 0.31000 2.44232 6.47321 
1.12000 0.32000 2.36991 6.07938 
1.12000 0.33000 2.30167 5.72042 
1.12000 0.34000 2.23724 5.39233 
1.12000 0.35000 2.17632 5.09168 
1.12000 0.36000 2.11862 4.81549 
1.12000 0.37000 2.06389 4.56117 
1.12000 0.38000 2.01192 4.32647 
1.12000 0.39000 1.96249 4.10943 
1.12000 0.40000 1.91544 3.90833 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.13000 0.01000 0.44373 133.31487 
1.13000 0.02000 6.93824 568.50244 
1.13000 0.03000 9.58486 411.36157 
1.13000 0.04000 9.73268 277.21094 
1.13000 0.05000 9.18116 194.46654 
1.13000 0.06000 8.48434 142.68629 
1.13000 0.07000 7.80630 108.73146 
1.13000 0.08000 7.19203 85.43761 
1.13000 0.09000 6.64858 68.82767 
1.13000 0.10000 6.17099 56.59387 
1.13000 0.11000 5.75117 47.33484 
1.13000 0.12000 5.38093 40.16455 
1.13000 0.13000 5.05293 34.50168 
1.13000 0.14000 4.76090 29.95320 
1.13000 0.15000 4.49959 26.24571 
1.13000 0.16000 4.26463 23.18463 
1.13000 0.17000 4.05237 20.62823 
1.13000 0.18000 3.85977 18.47166 
1.13000 0.19000 3.68431 16.63585 
1.13000 0.20000 3.52384 15.06029 
1.13000 0.21000 3.37656 13.69811 
1.13000 0.22000 3.24093 12.51248 
1.13000 0.23000 3.11566 11.47422 
1.13000 0.24000 2.99960 10.55986 
1.13000 0.25000 2.69179 9.75052 
1.13000 0.26000 2.79140 9.03068 
1.13000 0.27000 2.69769 8.38766 
1.13000 0.28000 2.61001 7.81089 
1.13000 0.29000 2.52782 7.29158 
1.13000 0.30000 2.45061 6.82237 
1.13000 0.31000 2.37796 6.39701 
1.13000 0.32000 2.30946 6.01020 
1.13000 0.33000 2.24478 5.65741 
1.13000 0.34000 2.18360 5.33479 
1.13000 0.35000 2.12566 5.03899 
1.13000 0.36000 2.07070 4.76711 
1.13000 0.37000 2.01850 4.51665 
1.13000 0.38000 1.96885 4.28541 
1.13000 0.39000 1.92158 4.07148 
1.13000 0.40000 1.87652 3.87319 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.14000 0.01000 0.01338 5.35256 
1.14000 0.02000 2.76185 283.81201 
1.14000 0.03000 6.01451 303.48560 
1.14000 0.04000 7.18857 231.38948 
1.14000 0.05000 7.34976 171.61507 
1.14000 0.06000 7.12109 129.83310 
1.14000 0.07000 6.75801 100.83803 
1.14000 0.08000 6.36323 80.26088 
1.14000 0.09000 5.97794 65.25636 
1.14000 0.10000 5.61771 54.02940 
1.14000 0.11000 5.28720 45.43277 
1.14000 0.12000 4.98642 38.71555 
1.14000 0.13000 4.71347 33.37286 
1.14000 0.14000 4.46578 29.05699 
1.14000 0.15000 4.24069 25.52243 
1.14000 0.16000 4.03596 22.59254 
1.14000 0.17000 3.84849 20.13750 
1.14000 0.18000 3.67707 18.06044 
1.14000 0.19000 3.51965 16.28784 
1.14000 0.20000 3.37469 14.76320 
1.14000 0.21000 3.24083 13.44248 
1.14000 0.22000 3.11689 12.29095 
1.14000 0.23000 3.00186 11.28098 
1.14000 0.24000 2.89482 10.39030 
1.14000 0.25000 2.79502 9.60092 
1.14000 0.26000 2.70174 8.89804 
1.14000 0.27000 2.61438 8.26950 
1.14000 0.28000 2.53242 7.70518 
1.14000 0.29000 2.45537 7.19665 
1.14000 0.30000 2.38280 6.73673 
1.14000 0.31000 2.31436 6.31958 
1.14000 0.32000 2.24969 5.93991 
1.14000 0.33000 2.18851 5.59343 
1.14000 0.34000 2.13054 5.27639 
1.14000 0.35000 2.07553 4.98553 
1.14000 0.36000 2.02326 4.71805 
1.14000 0.37000 1.97355 4.47152 
1.14000 0.38000 1.92620 4.24380 
1.14000 0.39000 1.88105 4.03303 
1.14000 0.40000 1.83796 3.83759 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.15000 0.01000 0.00015 0.07431 
1.15000 0.02000 0.88169 110.98940 
1.15000 0.03000 3.48159 205.54393 
1.15000 0.04000 5.10458 185.57529 
1.15000 0.05000 5.75082 148.08870 
1.15000 0.06000 5.88910 116.47496 
1.15000 0.07000 5.79040 92.61467 
1.15000 0.08000 5.58733 74.86937 
1.15000 0.09000 5.34375 61.54192 
1.15000 0.10000 5.09057 51.36690 
1.15000 0.11000 4.84261 43.46170 
1.15000 0.12000 4.60666 37.21677 
1.15000 0.13000 4.38549 32.20734 
1.15000 0.14000 4.17976 28.13309 
1.15000 0.15000 3.98913 24.77792 
1.15000 0.16000 3.81276 21.98392 
1.15000 0.17000 3.64959 19.63368 
1.15000 0.18000 3.49853 17.63873 
1.15000 0.19000 3.35852 15.93139 
1.15000 0.20000 3.22855 14.45921 
1.15000 0.21000 3.10768 13.18113 
1.15000 0.22000 3.99509 12.06466 
1.15000 0.23000 3.89001 11.08372 
1.15000 0.24000 2.79177 10.21737 
1.15000 0.25000 2.79975 9.44845 
1.15000 0.26000 2.61341 8.76293 
1.15000 0.27000 2.53227 8.14922 
1.15000 0.28000 2.45589 7.59764 
1.15000 0.29000 2.38387 7.10010 
1.15000 0.30000 2.31586 6.64978 
1.15000 0.31000 2.25154 6.24091 
1.15000 0.32000 2.19064 5.86857 
1.15000 0.33000 2.13289 5.52851 
1.15000 0.34000 2.07806 5.21713 
1.15000 0.35000 2.02593 4.93131 
1.15000 0.36000 1.97632 4.66831 
1.15000 0.37000 1.92905 4.42578 
1.15000 0.38000 1.88396 4.20164 
1.15000 0.39000 1.84091 3.99410 
1.15000 0.40000 1.79976 3.80155 
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Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.17000 0.01000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.17000 0.02000 0.04364 7.63849 
1.17000 0.03000 0.88257 69.42319 
1.17000 0.04000 2.24652 103.33188 
1.17000 0.05000 3.25700 101.80367 
1.17000 0.06000 3.83228 89.20244 
1.17000 0.07000 4.10777 75.55595 
1.17000 0.08000 4.20164 63.60898 
1.17000 0.09000 4.18995 53.76501 
1.17000 0.10000 4.11844 45.79041 
1.17000 0.11000 4.01419 39.33627 
1.17000 0.12000 3.89332 34.08369 
1.17000 0.13000 3.76540 29.77451 
1.17000 0.14000 3.63614 26.20764 
1.17000 0.15000 3.50889 23.22879 
1.17000 0.16000 3.38558 20.71954 
1.17000 0.17000 3.26725 18.58861 
1.17000 0.18000 3.15440 16.76523 
1.17000 0.19000 3.04718 15.19394 
1.17000 0.20000 2.94557 13.83108 
1.17000 0.21000 2.84938 12.64180 
1.17000 0.22000 2.75840 11.59818 
1.17000 0.23000 2.67234 10.67759 
1.17000 0.24000 2.59093 9.86160 
1.17000 0.25000 2.51387 9.13507 
1.17000 0.26000 2.44089 8.48549 
1.17000 0.27000 2.37172 7.90243 
1.17000 0.28000 2.30611 7.37714 
1.17000 0.29000 2.24381 6.90231 
1.17000 0.30000 2.18462 6.47170 
1.17000 0.31000 2.12831 6.07998 
1.17000 0.32000 2.07471 5.72266 
1.17000 0.33000 2.02363 5.39583 
1.17000 0.34000 1.97490 5.09611 
1.17000 0.35000 1.92839 4.82063 
1.17000 0.36000 1.88395 4.56684 
1.17000 0.37000 1.84145 4.33251 
1.17000 0.38000 1.80077 4.11572 
1.17000 0.39000 1.76180 3.91477 
1.17000 0.40000 1.72445 3.72816 
APPENDIX II 
Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.18000 0.01000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.18000 0.02000 0.00669 1.33814 
1.18000 0.03000 0.38125 34.03445 
1.18000 0.04000 1.38092 70.95309 
1.18000 0.05000 2.34657 80.59651 
1.18000 0.06000 3.00725 75.87134 
1.18000 0.07000 3.39521 66.95929 
1.18000 0.08000 3.59428 57.84735 
1.18000 0.09000 3.67226 49.75473 
1.18000 0.10000 3.67488 42.90375 
1.18000 0.11000 3.63145 37.19701 
1.18000 0.12000 3.56055 32.45827 
1.18000 0.13000 3.47391 28.51256 
1.18000 0.14000 3.37900 25.20950 
1.18000 0.15000 3.28057 22.42638 
1.18000 0.16000 3.18162 20.06522 
1.18000 0.17000 3.08403, 18.04832 
1.18000 0.18000 2.98897 16.31409 
1.18000 0.19000 2.89612 14.81348 
1.18000 0.20000 2.80885 13.50734 
1.18000 0.21000 2.72433 12.36408 
1.18000 0.22000 2.64360 11.35820 
1.18000 0.23000 2.56659 10.46881 
1.18000 0.24000 2.49321 9.67887 
1.18000 0.25000 2.42331 8.97426 
1.18000 0.26000 2.35673 8.34322 
1.18000 0.27000 2.29331 7.77596 
1.18000 0.28000 2.23289 7.26424 
1.18000 0.29000 2.17528 6.80109 
1.18000 0.30000 2.12034 6.38060 
1.18000 0.31000 2.06791 5.99772 
1.18000 0.32000 2.01784 5.64813 
1.18000 0.33000 1.97000 5.32808 
1.18000 0.34000 1.92424 5.03436 
1.18000 0.35000 1.88046 4.76418 
1.18000 0.36000 1.83853 4.51510 
1.18000 0.37000 1.79836 4.28499 
1.18000 0.38000 1.75982 4.07195 
1.18000 0.39000 1.72285 3.87438 
1.18000 0.40000 1.68734 3.69080 
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Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.21000 0.01000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.21000 0.02000 0.00001 0.00148 
1.21000 0.03000 0.01601 1.95684 
1.21000 0.04000 0.22798 15.72546 
1.21000 0.05000 0.71936 32.16931 
1.21000 0.06000 1.28104 40.78387 
1.21000 0.07000 1.75985 42.60379 
1.20000 0.08000 2.11624 40.85118 
1.21000 0.09000 2.36161 37.64839 
1.21000 0.10000 2.51997 34.06979 
1.21000 0.11000 2.61403 30.59700 
1.21000 0.12000 2.66185 27.41902 
1.21000 0.13000 2.67690 24.58929 
1.21000 0.14000 2.66891 22.10164 
1.21000 0.15000 2.64492 19.92625 
1.21000 0.16000 2.60994 18.02629 
1.21000 0.17000 2.56756 16.36508 
1.21000 0.18000 2.52039 14.90925 
1.21000 0.19000 2.47029 13.62943 
1.21000 0.20000 2.41857 12.50050 
1.21000 0.21000 2.36621 11.50105 
1.21000 0.22000 2.31390 10.61301 
1.21000 0.23000 2.26213 9.82110 
1.21000 0.24000 2.21124 9.11243 
1.21000 0.25000 2.16147 8.47610 
1.21000 0.26000 2.11296 7.90285 
1.21000 0.27000 2.06583 7.38483 
1.21000 0.28000 2.02013 6.91529 
1.21000 0.29000 1.97588 6.48848 
1.21000 0.30000 1.93309 6.09949 
1.21000 0.31000 1.89174 5.74402 
1.21000 0.32000 1.85180 5.41839 
1.21000 0.33000 1.81324 5.11940 
1.21000 0.34000 1.77603 4.84425 
1.21000 0.35000 1.74010 4.59050 
1.21000 0.36000 1.70543 4.35601 
1.21000 0.37000 1.67197 4.13891 
1.21000 0.38000 1.63965 3.93751 
1.21000 0.39000 1.60845 3.75037 
1.21000 0.40000 1.57832 3.57616 
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Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.23000 0.01000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.23000 0.02000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.23000 0.03000 0.00111 0.16064 
1.23000 0.04000 0.05074 4.12560 
1.23000 0.05000 0.27288 14.26399 
1.23000 0.06000 0.64552 23.72696 
1.23000 0.07000 1.04895 28.92944 
1.23000 0.08000 1.40461 30.50417 
1.23000 0.09000 1.68676 29.91655 
1.23000 0.10000 1.89697 28.25906 
1.23000 0.11000 2.04639 26.17366 
1.23000 0.12000 2.14762 24.00056 
1.23000 0.13000 2.21186 21.90666 
1.23000 0.14000 2.24815 19.96542 
1.23000 0.15000 2.26355 18.20192 
1.23000 0.16000 2.26342 16.61699 
1.23000 0.17000 2.25183 15.20012 
1.23000 0.18000 2.23187 13.93626 
1.23000 0.19000 2.20583 12.80913 
1.23000 0.20000 2.17547 11.80299 
1.23000 0.21000 2.14211 10.90328 
1.23000 0.22000 2.10676 10.09707 
1.23000 0.23000 2.07015 9.37285 
1.23000 0.24000 2.03287 8.72064 
1.23000 0.25000 1.99535 8.13176 
1.23000 0.26000 1.95791 7.59865 
1.23000 0.27000 1.92081 7.11481 
1.23000 0.28000 1.88420 6.67453 
1.23000 0.29000 1.84824 6.27297 
1.23000 0.30000 1.81301 5.90580 
1.23000 0.31000 1.77858 5.56933 
1.23000 0.32000 1.74499 5.26031 
1.23000 0.33000 1.71227 4.97590 
1.23000 0.34000 1.68043 4.71359 
1.23000 0.35000 1.64947 4.47121 
1.23000 0.36000 1.61939 4.24681 
1.23000 0.37000 1.59017 4.03868 
1.23000 0.38000 1.56181 3.84532 
1.23000 0.39000 1.53428 3.66537 
1.23000 0.40000 1.50756 3.49764 
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Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.25000 0.01000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.25000 0.02000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.25000 0.03000 0.00005 0.00826 
1.25000 0.04000 0.00881 0.82634 
1.25000 0.05000 0.08874 5.33205 
1.25000 0.06000 0.29390 12.33216 
1.25000 0.07000 0.58297 18.18588 
1.25000 0.08000 0.88659 21.56564 
1.25000 0.09000 1.16053 22.83817 
1.25000 0.10000 1.38761 22.73961 
1.25000 0.11000 1.56623 21.36925 
1.25000 0.12000 1.70152 20.61946 
1.25000 0.13000 1.80057 19.22356 
1.25000 0.14000 1.87035 17.81219 
1.25000 0.15000 1.91694 16.45430 
1.25000 0.16000 1.94536 15.18309 
1.25000 0.17000 1.95966 14.01157 
1.25000 0.18000 1.96303 12.94166 
1.25000 0.19000 1.95799 11.96948 
1.25000 0.20000 1.94651 11.08636 
1.25000 0.21000 1.93013 10.29051 
1.25000 0.22000 1.91006 9.56799 
1.25000 0.23000 1.88725 8.91313 
1.25000 0.24000 1.86244 8.31881 
1.25000 0.25000 1.83621 7.77861 
1.25000 0.26000 1.80903 7.28678 
1.25000 0.27000 1.78125 6.83799 
1.25000 0.28000 1.75315 6.42782 
1.25000 0.29000 1.72497 6.05215 
1.25000 0.30000 1.69686 5.70742 
1.25000 0.31000 1.66896 5.39047 
1.25000 0.32000 1.64138 5.09852 
1.25000 0.33000 1.61420 4.82906 
1.25000 0.34000 1.58747 4.57995 
1.25000 0.35000 1.56125 4.34923 
1.25000 0.36000 1.53555 4.13519 
1.25000 0.37000 1.51041 3.93629 
1.25000 0.38000 1.48583 3.75116 
1.25000 0.39000 1.46183 3.57859 
1.25000 0.40000 1.43840 3.41750 
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Mean Std Dev H (y) H* (y) 
1.27000 0.01000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.27000 0.02000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.27000 0.03000 0.00000 0.00027 
1.27000 0.04000 0.00119 0.12673 
1.27000 0.05000 0.02465 1.67665 
1.27000 0.06000 0.12035 5.69790 
1.27000 0.07000 0.30082 10.52701 
1.27000 0.08000 0.53031 14.36768 
1.27000 0.09000 0.76701 16.68614 
1.27000 0.10000 0.98416 17.69931 
1.27000 0.11000 1.16998 17.80659 
1.27000 0.12000 1.32204 17.35521 
1.27000 0.13000 1.44255 16.59180 
1.27000 0.14000 1.53552 15.67616 
1.27000 0.15000 1.60535 14.70644 
1.27000 0.16000 1.65612 13.74043 
1.27000 0.17000 1.69142 12.81048 
1.27000 0.18000 1.71426 11.93328 
1.27000 0.19000 1.72711 11.11614 
1.27000 0.20000 1.73199 10.36078 
1.27000 0.21000 1.73054 9.66581 
1.27000 0.22000 1.72408 9.02809 
1.27000 0.23000 1.71366 8.44368 
1.27000 0.24000 1.70015 7.90831 
1.27000 0.25000 1.68423 7.41774 
1.27000 0.26000 1.66646 6.96792 
1.27000 0.27000 1.64730 6.55505 
1.27000 0.28000 1.62710 6.17562 
1.27000 0.29000 1.60616 5.82646 
1.27000 0.30000 1.58472 5.50470 
1.27000 0.31000 1.56296 5.20773 
1.27000 0.32000 1.54105 4.93323 
1.27000 0.33000 1.51911 4.67911 
1.27000 0.34000 1.49723 4.44350 
1.27000 0.35000 1.47550 4.22472 
1.27000 0.36000 1.45398 4.02128 
1.27000 0.37000 1.43272 3.83181 
1.27000 0.38000 1.41176 3.65511 
1.27000 0.39000 1.39113 3.49010 
1.27000 0.40000 1.37086 3.33579 
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Mean Std Dev H (y) H' (y) 
1.28000 0.01000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.28000 0.02000 0.00000 0.00000 
1.28000 0.03000 0.00000 0.00004 
1.28000 0.04000 0.00040 0.04494 
1.28000 0.05000 0.01224 0.88123 
1.28000 0.06000 0.07395 3.70288 
1.28000 0.07000 0.20994 7.75616 
1.28000 0.08000 0.40157 11.45549 
1.28000 0.09000 0.61374 14.01530 
1.28000 0.10000 0.81876 15.40803 
1.28000 0.11000 1.00151 15.90156 
1.28000 0.12000 1.15634 15.79146 
1.28000 0.13000 1.28305 15.31184 
1.28000 0.14000 1.38402 14.62591 
1.28000 0.15000 1.46261 13.84015 
1.28000 0.16000 1.52231 13.02117 
1.28000 0.17000 1.56632 12.20899 
1.28000 0.18000 1.59745 11.42662 
1.28000 0.19000 1.61809 10.68627 
1.28000 0.20000 1.63021 9.99357 
1.28000 0.21000 1.63545 9.35005 
1.28000 0.22000 1.63515 8.75490 
1.28000 0.23000 1.63040 8.20592 
1.28000 0.24000 1.62210 7.70026 
1.28000 0.25000 1.61096 7.23476 
1.28000 0.26000 1.59759 6.80621 
1.28000 0.27000 1.58246 6.41150 
1.28000 0.28000 1.56598 6.04765 
1.28000 0.29000 1.54846 5.71194 
1.28000 0.30000 1.53018 5.40182 
1.28000 0.31000 1.51134 5.11499 
1.28000 0.32000 1.49213 4.84935 
1.28000 0.33000 1.47269 4.60301 
1.28000 0.34000 1.45313 4.37426 
1.28000 0.35000 1.43556 4.16155 
1.28000 0.36000 1.41405 3.96350 
1.28000 0.37000 1.39466 3.77882 
1.28000 0.38000 1.37545 3.60641 
1.28000 0.39000 1.35645 3.44523 
1.28000 0.40000 1.33770 3.29436 
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Competitor bids, bidder A's cost estimate and bid 
ratios for sixty eight sample bids 
Contractor A's 
Contract Cost Estimate Bidder Bid 
1 $ 17,600 R $ 18,461 
E 19,985 







































































Contractor A's Bid to Cost 
ntract Cost Estimate Bidder Bid Ratio 
9 99,000 K 108,390 1.095 
E 119,285 1.205 
C 134,768 1.361 
L 150,395 1.519 
D 153,328 1.549 
H 160,784 1.624 
10 50,300 J 57,864 1.150 
11 , 27,400 F 29,680 .962 
12 723,000 F 772,622 1.069 
E 794,489 1.099 
C 905,506 1.252 
B 1,081,078 1.495 
13 85,800 N 99,734 1.162 
F 104,350 1.216 
B 110,465 1.287 
M 126,111 1.470 
E 149,313 1.740 
14 54,400 H 57,934 1.065 
K 60,819 1.118 
LL 60,971 1.121 
15 48,500 H 49,090 1.012 
LL 54,174 1.117 
K 54,568 1.123 
16 8,750 AA 9,587 1.096 
G 10,105 1.155 
• BB 13,560 1.549 
17 47,800 LL 52,281 1.094 
K 54,024 1.130 
D 77,134 1.614 
G 80,343 1.681 
18 54,500 LL 56,547 1.038 
K 63,343 1.162 
D 85,719 1.573 






















Bid to Cost 
dder Bid Ratio 
UU 68,259 .815 
D 80,543 .961 
N 93,598 1.117 
D 1,436,260 1.035 
B 1.580,638 1.139 
C 277,737 1.258 
D 284,500 1.288 
B 290,726 1.317 
E 296,369 1.342 
TT 217,568 .945 
C 208,111 1.338 
R 196,369 . 1.115 
J 205,769 1.168 
N 217,021 1.232 
U 247,681 1.406 
E 296,370 1.683 
C 220,315 1.087 
N 244,717 1.207 
B 253,737 1.252 
K 33,456 1.079 
LL 34,180 1.103 
N 39,768 1.283 
J 31,567 1.115 
UU 32,140 1.136 
V 32,224 1.269 
B 1,034,639 1.107 
E 1,225,302 1.310 
C 1,368,578 1.464 
LL 43,072 .995 
K 49,995 1.155 
YY 68,430 1.580 
M 71,425 1.650 
LL 50,190 .986 
K 57,388 1.127 
YY 68,430 1.344 














Cost Estimate Bidder Bid 
Bid to Cost 
Ratio 
150,200 M 172,898 1.151 
TT 174,979 1.165 
I 204,816 1.364 
V 234,335 1.560 
56,000 H 58,190 1.039 
D 59,955 1.071 
M 62.999 1.125 
B 69,442 1.240 
650,600 GG 723,337 1.112 
M 747,133 1.148 
B 785,516 1.207 
C 867,521 1.333 
19,200 M 18,670 .972 
J 21,141 1.101 
DD 21,697 1.130 
TT 21,932 1.142 
I 23,251 1.211 
185,700 J 206,035 
t 
1.110 
R 206,820 1.114 
N 211,530 1.139 
TT 226,738 1.221 
935,000 F 971,367 1.039 
E 1,039,607 1.112 
V 1,096,013 1.172 
I 1,142,449 1.222 
B 1,169,401 1.251 
128,100 N 127,744 .997 
M 137,427 1.073 
J 140,572 1.097 
TT 147,671 1.153 
C 178,736 1.395 
20,500 V 19,784 .965 
M 22,625 1.104 
TT 22,641 1.104 
I 22,852 1.115 
C 23,356 1.139 
34,500 G 26,777 .776 




Contractor A's Bid to Cost 
Contract Cost Estimate Bidder Bid Ratio 
39 47,600 T 44,838 .942 
M 49,792 1.046 
GG 53,166 1.117 
J 55,627 1.169 
B 56,870 1.195 
40 10,200 J 13,531 1.327 
I 13,601 1.333 
B 14,936 1.464 
AC 16,108 1.579 
41 75,400 M 78,633 1.043 
TT 83,803 1.111 
J 91,333 1.211 
C 104,014 1.379 
42 403,700 Q 393,700 .975 
M 470,000 1.164 • 
B 621,496 1.539 
43 31,500 CC 29,213 .927 
AG 29,987 .952 
DD 31,054 .986 
EE 34,819 1.105 
FF 35,967 1.142 
GG 48,879 1.552 
44 20,400 G 16,355 .802 
YY 22,071 1.082 
K 24,577 1.205 
AA 24,744 1.213 
HH 25,314 1.241 
45 48,800 SS 43,500 .891 
» RR 46,047 .944 
D 46,800 .959 
QQ 51,541 1.056 
KK 54,575 1.116 
PP 57,795 1.184 
J 58,500 1.199 
C 60,500 1.240 
• M 68,500 1.404 
AE 74,200 1.520 
U 74,700 1.531 





Cost Estimate Bidder Bid 
Bid to Cost 
Ratio 
46 63,800 K 66,101 1.036 
D 68,121 1.068 
CC 69,459 1.089 
PP 74,272 1.164 
L 76,305 1.196 
G 77,552 1.216 
HH 79,455 1.245 
M 84,879 1.330 
H 92,343 1.447 
. 
C 94,753 1.485 
47 180,000 C 214,244 1.190 
J 216,672 1.204 
N 228,619 1.270 
GG 229,955 1.278 
AB 259,606 1.442 
48 143,000 F 161,124 1.127 
I 161,540 1.130 
V 163,967 1.147 
M 168,705 1.180 
II 177,558 1.242 
49 79,600 DD 82,820 1.040 
R 87,925 1.105 
J 91,104 1.145 
50 111,500 CC 125,583 1.126 
M 126,802 1.137 
II 129,366 1.160 
I 131,841 1.182 
DD 132,173 1.185 
51 310,100 M 304,845 .983 
* I 326,168 1.058 
DD 334,236 1.078 
F 352,108 1.135 













Bid to Cost 








BB 852,265 1.178 
H 868,780 1.201 
D 896,667 1.240 
P 984,605 1.361 
L 1,028,255 1.422 
K 1,163,372 1.602 
0 594,820 1.119 
L 630,325 1.186 
H 764,074 1.438 
G 775,475 1.460 
XX 51,277 1.115 
DD 51.469 1.119 
AA 51,958 1.129 
I.L 55,861 1.214 
WW 60,438 1.314 
K 64,733 1.407 
II 99,518 .917 
JJ 103,261 .952 
I 119,482 1.101 
KK 123,559 1.139 
D 38,550 .999 
I 41,365 1.072 
E 42,605 1.104 
GG 43,235 1.120 
LL 43,473 1.126 
J 45,904 1.189 
II 46,952 1.216 
F 47,940 1.242 
DD 48,373 1.253 
C 51,020 1.322 
G 110,705 1.113 
K 138,488 1.392 
D 151,317 1.521 
GG 152,195 1.530 
LL 161,181 1.620 
DD 28,296 1.064 
XX 29,407 1.106 
LL 29,799 1.120 




Contract Cost Estimate Bidder Bid 
59 44,500 PP 43,994 
GG 44,306 
II 49,672 
* K 49,815 
J 51,172 




* DD 394,766 






































































Contractor A's Bid to Cost 
Contract Cost Estimate Bidder Bid Ratio 
66 137,500 DD 144,653 1.052 
JJ 155,494 1.131 
M 157,425 1.145 
KK 158,510 1.153 
NN 174,789 1.271 
00 175,354 1.275 
67 31,200 c 34,982 1.121 
Q 35,629 1.142 
B 36,394 1.166 
M 36,436 1.168 
68 178,400 CC 165,572 .928 
* QQ 183,345 1.028 
DD 192,983 1.032 
• 
F 196,876 1.104 
W 200,787 1.125 
V 201,342 1.129 
JJ 207,138 1.161 
C 220,023 1.233 
KK 233,268 1.308 
- AD 246,133 1.380 
APPENDIX IV 
Frequency distribution and Histogram of lowest competito 






.75- .80 1 .0147 
.80- .85 2 .0294 
.85- .90 2 .0294 
.90- .95 6 .0882 
.95-1.00 12 .1765 
1.00-1.05 12 .1765 
1.05-1.10 11 .1618 
1.10-1.15 14 . 2059 
1.15-1.20 6 .0882 
1.20-1.25 0 .0000 
1.25-1.30 1 .0147 









Frequency distribution and Histogram of bid to cost ratios 
































1.4-1.5 1 Freq. 
Mean 1.1755 


















1.0 l. l ] . 2 
Class Limits 
Mean 1.1273 
Standard deviation .0841 
151 
APPENDIX V 
Frequency distribution and Histogram of bid to cost ratios 






















































Standard deviation .1336 
152 
APPENDIX V 
Frequency distribution and Histogram of bid to cost ratios 
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Frequency distribution and Histogram of bid to cost ratios 














Standard deviation .0692 















Standard deviation .1642 
154 
APPENDIX VI 
Frequency distribution and histogram of bid to cost ratios 
of non-union contractors which competitor A bid against 









































74 .94 1.54 1.74 
155 
APPENDIX VII 
Frequency distribution and histogram of bid to cost ratios 
of union contractors which competitor A bid against less 









































Computer programs used in generating the bidding table 
contained in Appendix II. 










0011 DO 10 M=KL,KU 
0012 XM=M 
0013 XMI=XM/100 . 













0027 10 1 = 1 = 1 
0028 WRITE (NPRT,3000) 
0029 WRITE (NPRT,3010)((X(I,J),J=1,8),1=1,550) 
0030 1 = 1 
0031 20 CONTINUE 
0032 STOP 
0033 3000 FORMAT('1') 
0034 3010 FORMAT(8(IX,FI0.5,IX)) 
0035 END 
APPENDIX IX 
Computer program used in generating the bidding table 
contained in Appendix I. 
0001 • DIMENSION X(1000,10) 
0002 NCRD=1 
r\ n n o V/ W U J NPRT=3 
0004 READ (NCRD,1000)N 
0005 READ (NCRD,1010) ((X(I,J),J=1,4),I=1,N) 
0006 DO 10 K=1 ,N 






0013 10 X(K,6)=(-2.-(XK2*XK4)/(XK3*XK3)) 
0014 WRITE (NPRT,3000) 
0015 WRITE (NPRT,3010)((X(I,J),J=1,6),I=1,N) 
0016 STOP 
0017 1000 FORMAT (14) 
0018 1010 FORMAT (F4.2,1X,F5.4,1X,F5.4,1X,F5.4) 
0019 3000 FORMAT ('1') 




Computer program used in the computation of the expected 
value of a contract, when bidding against three competitors, 
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Paired sample bid to cost ratios for six pairs of competitor 
Competitors ; C and E Competitors K and LL 
1.097 1.157 1.392 1.620 
1 w 104 .980 1.320 1.119 
1.522 1.159 1.212 1.120 
1.252 1.099 1.155 .995 
1.258 1.342 1.127 .986 
1.464 1.310 1.407 1.214 
1.361 1.205 1.162 1.038 
1.292 1.273 1.130 1.094 
1.332 1.170 1.079 1.103 
1.332 1.104 1.123 1.117 
1.386 1.072 1.118 1.121 
1.101 1.154 1.044 1.271 
Competitors ; B and E Competitors B and C 
.999 1.57 .999 1.097 
1.386 .980 1.386 1.104 
1.434 1.159 1.434 1.522 
1.495 1.099 1.495 1.252 
1.287 1.740 1.317 1.258 
1.317 1.342 1.252 1.087 
1.107 1.310 1.107 1.464 • 
1.251 1.112 1.207 1.333 
1.120 1.076 1.296 1.108 
1.267 1.170 1.166 1.121 
1.243 1.154 1.267 1.332 
1.243 1.101 
Competitors C and M Competitors B and M 
1.333 1.148 1.287 1.470 
1.379 1.043 1.670 1.151 
1.120 1.118 1.240 1.125 
1.121 1.168 1.207 1.148 
1.139 1.104 1.195 1.046 
1.240 1.404 1.120 1.102 
1.485 1.330 1.166 1.168 
1.395 1.073 1.539 1.164 
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APPENDIX XII 
Paired sample standardized bid to cost ratios fox six pairs 
of competitors. 
Competitors C and E Competitors K and L] 
.997 1.052 1.008 1.173 
.929 .825 1.134 .962 
1.177 .896 1.083 1.001 
1.032 .906 .893 .769 
1.003 1.070 .915 .801 
1.165 1.043 1.158 .999 
1.008 .893 .878 .784 
1.090 1.074 .849 .822 
1.163 1.021 .930 .951 
1.140 .952 1.004 .999 
1.032 .798 .965 .968 
.962 1.008 .863 1.050 
Competitors B and E Competitors B and C 
.908 1.052 .908 .997 
1.386 .825 1.166 .929 
1.109 .896 1.109 1.177 
1.232 .906 1.232 1.032 
.967 1.307 1.050 1.003 
1.050 1.070 1.063 .923 
.881 1.043 .881 1.165 
1.077 .957 1.017 1.123 
1.021 .981 1.103 .943 
1.106 1.021 1.019 .979 
1.086 1.008 1.106 1.163 
1.086 .962 
Competitors C and M Competitors B and M 
1.123 .967 .967 1.104 
1.160 .877 1.256 .865 
.990 .988 1.067 .968 
.979 1.020 1.017 .967 
1.036 1.005 1.086 .951 
1.017 1.152 1.021 1.004 
1.215 1.038 1.019 1.020 
1.204 .926 1.256 .950 
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•APPENDIX XIII 
Computer program used in simulation of fifty bids against 
five competitors 
DIMENSION X(201,13) 











DO 200 N=1,50 
XLAST=-1 
1 = 1 






DO 10 M=1000,1200 
XM1=M 
Y=XM1/10 00. 




DO 12 M2=3,7 
X(I,M2)=ERFC(Z(M2-2)/SQ2)/2. 
12 CONTINUE 
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